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*THE DIVINE RESERVE.**

Then Peter, turning about, seeth the disciple whom Jesus loved, following; .... Peter seeing him saith to Jesus, Lord, what shall this man do? Jesus saith unto him, If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee? Follow thou me.—John xxi. 20-22.

They asked of him, saying, Lord, wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel? And he said unto them, It is not for you to know the times or the seasons, which the Father hath put in his own power. But ye shall receive power after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you: and ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth.—Acts i. 6-8.

THE question in each of these cases is our question. It is the question which we in like circumstances should have liked to ask, or at any rate to have had answered. We do not wonder that Peter, when he learned of the fate that awaited himself, turned towards John, and wanted to know what was in reserve for him. Nor, again, do we wonder at the question of the disciples. They had learned many things since the evening they gathered with the Master at the last supper. All that they had thus learned went to establish Him in their minds as the Messiah. It did not, however, wholly correct their views as to the nature of His office, and of the kingdom He came to establish. The ominous character of the events through which they and He had just passed only made them the more anxious to know whether this was not the long expected time when the kingdom should be restored.

The two questions—that of Peter concerning John and that of

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the disciples concerning the kingdom—have a common character. They differ widely as to subject matter, but in the disposition that prompted them, viewed as expressions of desire, they are essentially one. The desire is one that was common to Peter with all the disciples, and that is common to us with the disciples and all men, —the desire to know what is before us, what lies in the future, in God's purpose, for us and for ours; and to know it, if possible, in its times and seasons.

We need not dwell upon the fact of the existence of these desires in men generally. We are all aware of it in ourselves, and need no proof of it in others. The important thing here is that we have before us two instances when that desire was expressed to one able to have gratified it, and that we have His answer. I have said that the two questions were virtually one. The same may be said of the answers. Combine them and we have our Lord's complete answer to man's desire to know what lies hidden for himself and others in the purposes of God.

The first thing we get in this answer is *an explicit statement of the Divine reserve.* God does not disclose all His purposes to man, even when those purposes most intimately concern man. There are some things that affect man vitally, the times and the seasons of whose coming God refuses to allow him to know. This is the burden of our Lord's answer to Peter and to the disciples. This character of the answer is the more significant because the answer was given under conditions favourable to an answer of a different character. The conditions could hardly have been more favourable for getting from the Master the answer desired. The desire was expressed by His nearest friends, by those who were called and commissioned to take His Gospel to men, and, in one case at least, the question put seemed to touch vitally the very cause disciple and Master had in common. If these men might not know the future, then who might know it? If times and seasons would not be revealed touching this interest, then on what human interest would they be revealed?

The fact that the Divine reserve was maintained by our Lord in face of the importunity of the whole body of His intimate disciples, and on points that seemed vital to the interests of the kingdom, is enough to teach us that we live under this reserve as a settled law of our existence. It is not merely that by reason of the limitation of our being we cannot of our own power attain the knowledge, but it is that God of His determinate purpose will not admit us to

it; He purposely withholds it from us. There are, we thus come to know, whole regions of knowledge which God of set purpose has not opened to us.

We are apt to forget this in dealing with that body of knowledge which He has given us in His Word. We expect too much of this revelation. We think of it as a complete opening up of an otherwise inscrutable region of knowledge. We expect it to answer questions which it was not given to answer, and which it was designed we should not have answered. We bring all sorts of curious inquiries, therefore, to the Scriptures. We importune them on a thousand matters that have no vital relation to our interests, or to the interests of the kingdom of Christ, and we are hurt if we get no answer.

The truth is, the reserve that marked the personal communication of Jesus is in every part of the Scriptures. It touches, too, other points than those of individual destiny. It was in the Word before the days of Christ's ministry; it remained in it until the close. It distinguishes the Bible from other professed communications from heaven. In nothing is the Word more consistent with itself than in its discriminating, impenetrable, sovereign reserve. Jesus explicitly refused to tell the disciples what they were importunate to know, and what they may have thought they had a right to know. So equally in vain do *we* question this written Word on matters which may seem to us of the deepest interest, and of really vital importance. We get to many of our questions no better answer than did Peter and the disciples: "What is that to you?"; "It is not yours to know."

Let us, then, in dealing with the Bible expect to meet this reserve, and let us not be offended by it, as if God were dealing unfairly by us. Let us rather learn from it what it is that God regards as of vital importance for us to know. We should note, however, that the answer of Jesus is not, to either of these questions, a *blank* refusal. There is in it a flat refusal to give the knowledge desired, but there is something more. That is given which in the end is better than knowledge. Three things are given in connection with the refusal of knowledge:— *a command, a commission, and a promise.*

To Peter's question Jesus makes answer, What is that to thee? *Follow thou me.* The refusal of the request is immediately followed by a peremptory command to duty. While refusing to Peter the knowledge of what was in reserve for his friend John, Jesus relin-

quishes in nothing His demand upon him, but with the tones of authority commands him to continued discipleship. Our obligation to follow Christ does not depend upon our knowledge of what we or others may in following Him be called to do or suffer. Our duty is to follow, even though the events of the way are to be reserved from us. Our duty is to follow though another's pathway be pleasanter or easier than ours. Such following is of the essence of faith. Thus when Abraham is presented as an example of faith, it is particularly said of him: "By faith Abraham, when he was called to go out into a place which he should afterward receive for an inheritance, obeyed: and he went out, not knowing whither he went." Such a faith is exacted of every man in the call of God, whether that call come to him through the Gospel, or in the voice of his own conscience. For a man cannot in this world steadfastly obey the voice of his own conscience without being called, at times, to go forth, not knowing whither he goes. And if we take the history of the race from Abraham down, we shall see that the best things have come to the world through men who have thus followed God.

After all, who knows, or, do what he will, can know, much of the way that lies before him? Every man must go forth into an unknown way. It is the law of our life. There is no escape from it in reason or in nature. Revelation itself provides no exemption from it. Revelation does, however, promise us personal guidance in the unknown way, and assure us of the ultimate goal. Whatever the incidents of the way, whatever its sorrows and calamities even, we may be certain that the end will be well, if we are willing to listen to the voice that said to Peter, "Follow thou me."

To the question of the disciples Jesus answers: "It is not yours to know." "But ye shall receive power after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you, and ye shall be witnesses unto me, both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth."

Knowledge is asked, but instead of knowledge the Master gives a commission. Knowledge of times the disciples may not have, but here is a commission to work that sends them into all the world as their field. In the economy of God's kingdom, we observe, the withholding of knowledge does not exempt from service. We are called to work, even though not admitted to the counsels of the Master. We may not know how long we shall be called to work; we may not know what kind of service will be exacted of us to-morrow, nor where it will be rendered; we may not know how

our service will tell upon the general result; yet we are required to give it, how and where and so long as the Master may call for it.

A *promise* prefaces the commission. And the promise is in character with the commission. "Ye shall receive power," it reads. Two kinds of power are spoken of in the New Testament: one means privilege, prerogative, authority. This kind of power is spoken of in John i.12, where it is said, "To them gave he power to become sons of God," that is, privilege or right to become sons of God. Again, the same word is used in Acts i.7, where it is said, "Times and seasons the Father hath put in his own power," that is, prerogative, authority. The other kind of power, expressed by a different word, is might, force, ability to withstand or to do. Paul speaks of this kind of power when he prays that the Ephesians "may be strengthened with might in the inner man." The same kind of power is meant here when Christ says to His disciples, "Ye shall receive *power* after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you." *Power,* be it observed, not high prerogative, not authority in the kingdom, not penetration into the Divine counsels, no far-reaching sweep of the field, but power,—that mean and commonplace thing, might, ability to do, strength to withstand, capacity for service.

Our prerogative, then, like that of the Apostles, is pre-eminently that of *service,* not that of knowledge. We are called in the kingdom to *do* rather than to *know.* We are, perhaps, capable of more knowledge than we have, that is, we might have received some information which God has not been pleased to give us. But enough knowledge has been given to direct our service; and it is in *service* that God exacts; it is *service* that the world needs of us; and it is in *service* that our own highest good and our surest peace lie.

Knowledge without service is disappointing. The man who desires to know but is unwilling to serve disappoints himself and the world is disappointed in him. The man merely learned in the things that belong to God and His plans and purposes, full of deep and mysterious love of the spiritual world, if such a man could be, would be of little use to the world. God seems, from the plan of His revelation, to have intended that such a man should not be. The attempt at knowledge of things of God without service fails us. If we would really know the things of God, what God has for us and for the world, we must serve as well as study. Service, docile obedience to the divine call, is the only sure pathway to knowledge. Once we give ourselves to service working under God's command, with teachable minds open towards our Master and the counsels

of His Word, knowledge will come. For service under God's command interprets His word, as it does largely the daily providence that affects us. The knowledge, too, that is reached in this way is high knowledge; it is knowledge of God, of His ways with men, of His dealings with the human spirit; it is even a certain penetration into the divine mind, so that we come to be able in some measure to forecast God's ways. Here, indeed,

> "old experience doth attain
> To something like prophetic strain."

God hath ordained, too, that this service shall in the case of most of us be attended with suffering. It is the lot of most men to do the work of life with more or less attendant pain. Pain comes in by various avenues and mingles with our work, and gives quality to it. Calamity, ill-health, reverse of fortune, broken purposes, bereavement, nameless sorrows, one or more may contribute the element of pain to our service. Are we crippled thereby? I think not. We sometimes feel that the pain we suffer hinders our service. So Paul thought regarding his thorn in the flesh. He feared its buffetings would unfit him for his work, and so besought God for its removal. But the thorn was not removed, his thrice repeated prayer was denied. Was Paul a feebler instrument for the thorn? The truth is we are not at the height of our efficiency in our service of men until we have had in ourselves the divine discipline of suffering. The might to endure pain for Christ's sake, the power to meet and bear the sorrows and adversities of life, got through experience of them, if sanctified by God's grace, makes us better servants, more skilful ministers to the sorrows and the needs of men, greater blessings to the world. It brings us, too, to a larger knowledge of God.

J. R. WILSON.

SIVAN SEYAL.

(1) I KNEW not that everything comes by the deed of Sivan. I made no effort from day to day to drive away vain thoughts. The flood of lust came and seized me and dragged me along. I fell into bondage to lust and, alas, having committed sin after sin, I am in anguish, sinner that I am.

(2) Sinner that I am, what shall I do? O Great One, I have not

bowed at thy feet. Tears fill my eyes. I cry 'O Siva! Siva!' I faint, but I have not called on thee, my Life, to come and fill my life. O thou Ambrosia! I am withering away. I am drowning in my religion. I am in jeopardy in this mortal world.

(3) Often weeping, thrilled through and through, arising often, O Lord (*eiya*), I have reached thy refuge at last. Nevermore let me go! When wilt thou follow me and make me thy disciple, so that I, like a carved image, shall stay unshaken, with humbled (*lit.* broken) mind, and with clasped hands, crying 'With thee indeed is safety,' O Light? O Eternal Lord!

(4) O Great Lord (*perumán*) that art beginning, middle, and end, unlimited, light of the mind and of the universe, happiness (*sukham*)! Is it right that I, thy servant, should be left untaught how to be happy? What can I do who am so ignorant? Not only does my mind (*manam*) torment me, but the organs of perception, with their sensations, harm me more than fire.

(5) The sensations like hunters enter the organs of perception, and drag me along, and roast me with the fire of sexual desire, and devour me alive. With broken heart, forgetting my body, I suffer, wandering about like an infant (*séy*) that has lost its mother. O Jewel, thou alone shinest as light, Lord (*náyakan*) in the assembly of saints (at Sithambaram), thou art more gracious than a mother, O Lord (*náthan*), Sea of Wisdom!

(6) O thou whose form is wisdom, object sought by seekers, sky that fillest the eye! O way above (*ongumárkkam*) that hast come to me! O Silent One, unknown to those who are ignorant (*merular*)! O First! Good seed of liberation! Gift of endless happiness! O Penance! To forget myself, I, thy humble servant, thought of thee.

(7) The wealth of this sinful world is needful, if one is to perform the service of charity to thy devotees when they come; and for the sake of blissful wonderful ecstasy (*nittei*) the state of detachment (*turavathu*) is needful. O silent One, if thou art ever to give me thy pure, good grace, it is needful for me to be born again! O thou object only possessed by those who can subdue (all) thoughts of 'I' and 'my'.

(8) O great mountain of penance (*tavakkunré*) possessed by the possessors (of wisdom)! O sea of abounding grace! O help to good (*i.e.*, effectual) penance! Sea of bliss! To those who lack sight, wisdom, love (*nayam*), thou art the mingler (*i.e.*, the giver) of love (*nadpu*) that does not fail. Did not I, in order to see thee, place my love (*anbu*) at thy feet and listen to thy wisdom?

(9) O Light of Love that didst show the way of light to the four sages when they were in this world; thou showest thy three eyes and blue throat (now) in the 'golden assembly' at Sithambaram. O Sky! O Moon, that dispersest the thick dense darkness (of ignorance) within me! O thought, inspiring those who have passed the torment of earthly sorrow and joy! O Love! I am in thy care.

(10) In thy fulness I am lost! It is right to make me like thee, in order that I may abound in the abiding peace (*samam*) which thou thyself art, who art Light greater than all (light.) Thou appearest like a cloud; thou givest the 'way' which is neither single nor twofold (*i.e.* the *Saiva Siddhanta*); like honey that loses not its sweetness thou art mingled in the minds of thy lovers, O Fortune (*selvam*)! O God (*sivam*) of supreme wisdom.

The Tamil poem of Tayumanavar thus translated is an exceedingly beautiful specimen of Tamil verse, and does not suffer so much from over-elaboration as some of Tayumanavar's poems do. It is impossible for much of its beauty to be rendered into English, for it lies in the swing of the Tamil metre and the flow of the syllables; but I have tried to translate the words accurately in the hope that the translation may at least indicate something of the rhythm of the thought.

In translating religious poems into a foreign language there is always a difficulty in rendering words that represent the highest religious emotions and aspirations, and this difficulty is increased tenfold when not only the structure of the languages but the methods of thought familiar to the users of the languages are totally diverse. This difficulty is further increased in any interpretation of a poem like the one above, by the fact that the poet does not develop his thoughts. The processes of spiritual awakening described are referred to in brief words, many of them not Tamil but Sanskrit in origin. The temptation to paraphrase rather than translate is great, and I may not have been quite successful in resisting it.

The poem is at once a confession and a thanksgiving: a confession of sin and weakness, a wail over moral vacillation and ineptitude, and a joyful declaration of the loving kindness and tender mercy of God. But the poet has not risen to the Christian conception of the salvation that consecrates the activities to the service of the Redeemer, and can only think of salvation from sin as an identification of the self with the personal revealed god Sivan,

and, through him, the attainment of a complete union with the supreme Sivam, in which the ego is lost in the Supreme Impersonal. It is here that the influence of the Vedánta appears, and the perplexing eclecticism of the poet makes it impossible for us to avoid the conclusion that certainly in his day—of which I am uncertain—the original *Saiva Siddhánta* had been modified by Vedántic speculation. To my mind it seems probable that the outline of the *Saiva Siddhánta* given by Mádhava Achárya in the fourteenth century A.D. approximates fairly closely to the original system, and that system did not lay emphasis on the merging of the individual self in the Supreme Selfless One.

The poem under consideration has a unity and purpose which distinguish it from many Tamil poems. It was evidently written to set forth a definite series of spiritual experiences, and as we read it we can trace the writer's history from ungodliness to earnest faith. The poem opens with a confession of a very sad past, of a life lived without God in bondage to lust and sensuality. This confession is followed by a cry of despair, in which the human soul recognises its peril, but will not seek help from God to battle with self. In the third stanza, this pride breaks down and the penitent describes how at last he turned to God, and was willing to be taught of God, anxious only to stay in God's grace as an image remains unshaken in the Holy Place within the precincts of the temple. This was followed by another fierce battle with the physical self. Asceticism, by its mistaken conception of self-subjection, is bound to fear and loathe the most ordinary natural sensations; but the poet had evidently to fight against strong tendencies to sensualism, and the fourth and fifth stanzas are a witness to the war. In the sixth verse, the hope of salvation again grows bright, and the seeker concentrates his thoughts on God to escape from himself. In the next stanza the characteristic Hindu idea of salvation as the state of complete detachment from earthly aims and passions and the destruction of all idea of personality appears. It is in detachment from personality and attachment to God that the poet seeks liberation from his load of guilt. As the thought of the love of the God who teaches this wisdom fills the poet's mind he breaks out into rapturous expressions of his devotion, and rejoices that now he is 'the care' of God. In the last stanza this rapture find its highest utterance, and though there is to the Western mind a certain grotesqueness about some of the similes, yet it is evident to the most casual observer that here we have the triumph song of a man

who knows that he is lost in the fulness of God, saved from sin and self.

One or two notes may be helpful to some readers. In the third verse the phrase rendered 'thrilled through and through' means literally 'with the hair of my body standing on end', through fear or joy. Phrases with this meaning constantly occur in Tamil literature.

In the fourth stanza the usual distinctions of ordinary Hindu psychology are referred to. The self (*átma*) is regarded as severed from all outward cognitions, as a king in the seclusion of his palace is undisturbed by the affairs of his people. The mind (*manas*) is the confidential minister who presents all matters in orderly fashion to the king, one at a time. The five organs of perception of course are represented as the servants of the minister who gather news of all sorts, in all ways, for his behoof. The news they gather is the sensations. According to the old Saiva school both the soul and matter, which fetters the soul with sensations, are realities. Hence the Saiva poet does not here question the objectivity of his perceptions. To a true Vedántin the self, the mind, the senses, and all their perceptions are but the play of illusion.

In the fifth verse the simile refers to the wild jungle tribes, who eat the flesh of all kinds of animals. They are usually aboriginal tribes, and are quite distinct from the gipsy races. The reference to the assembly of *saints in* Sithambaram is founded on the tradition of the Golden Assembly of the devotees of Siva in the famous thousand-pillared hall in the great temple of Natarája at Sithambaram, that figures so largely in all Saiva *purânas* and poems. This great hall is remarkable for having an arched roof over what may be called the nave of the building. The thousand pillars support the flat roof of the transepts and cloisters.

The 'liberation' of which the silent Teacher is the 'good seed' is that deliverance from the bonds of material existence supposed to be obtained in the meditations of the true ascetic. A commentator remarks that the general meaning of the whole verse is that complete oblivion of self is to be obtained by meditation concentrated on God.

'The service of charity to thy devotees', mentioned in the seventh verse, is the almsgiving to religious mendicants, so highly esteemed by all Hindus. In this verse there occurs a reference to rebirth worth notice. The poet despairs of attaining complete union with the Supreme in this life, and declares his belief that it will not be till after being reborn that he will attain sufficient merit to attain

Siva's grace. The reference to the subjugation of all egoistic thoughts seems to me to point to the influence of the Vedánta.

In the eighth verse the curious phrase, 'mountain of penance', is addressed to Sivan. The idea seems to be that just as a mountain on this earth yields gold and jewels to those who seek, so God will grant the jewel called penance or asceticism to those who seek Him. One of the most beautiful features of Tamil religious thought comes out in this verse. The Tamil poet has clearly grasped the idea of the love of God, and that God is full of love and gracious kindness.

The reference to the four sages in the ninth verse is to the *rishis* Sanakan, Sanantan, Sanakkumáran, Sanáthan, the four sons of Brahmá, who after long penance attained to knowledge of Siva. 'Those who have passed the torment of earthly sorrow and joy' are the devotees who have subdued all human appetites and lusts and yielded themselves to unbroken meditation on Sivam.

Such notes might be multiplied indefinitely. Every phrase of this poem is linked with religious associations or much pondered thoughts, and has a history. But I have written enough to enable the reader to see the meaning of the poet, if not the full force of all his beautiful words, and I trust that as a description of deep religious emotions and as the revelation of the heart-secrets of a most devout mind it will be read thoughtfully and sympathetically.

A. C. CLAYTON.

THE ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HERBERT SPENCER.

A SPECIAL interest attaches to Mr. Spencer's system of Ethics, as developed in his *Principles of Ethics,* for he regards his ethical speculation as the culmination of his Synthetic Philosophy. When, in 1879, he brought out the first part of this work, he had doubts as to whether he would live long enough to complete the whole work. It is a matter for thankfulness that he has been spared in health to complete this the "last part of his task, to which the preceding parts are subsidiary," for we have now his whole system of ethics in the two volumes of *Principles of Ethics* which were issued complete in 1897. Of the six parts that constitute this remarkable contribution to philosophic thought, the first,

—the *Data of Ethics*—is the most important, for it contains in outline Mr. Spencer's system of evolutional ethics, which the other parts merely amplify and elucidate.

Mr. Spencer was one of the first, if not the first, to apply the principle of organic evolution to human character and society. Man, in common with lower animals, is capable of indefinite change by adaptation to environment. He undergoes transformation from a nature appropriate to a wild uncivilized life to one appropriate to a civilized life, and during this process of evolution there takes place an evolution of conduct which fits him better for harmonious cooperation. What we call ethical conduct is, therefore, a process of evolution; its ground of authority is rooted in the very nature of humanity and does not come to man as an imposed law. Ethics is only a part of philosophy, which accounts for the cosmic process in general by the principle of evolution. The study of moral conduct, therefore, which is always a complex problem, becomes, in the hands of Mr. Spencer, still more complex, for one of his main ideas is that ethical conduct can be interpreted only by an adequate knowledge of the cosmical process in which it forms a feature. This cosmical process is interpreted by one great formula which he enunciates as follows:—"Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation."

This formula, which starts with only matter and motion, fails utterly to account for the commencement of life and consciousness. The latest critic of Mr. Spencer—Professor James Ward—in his work on *Agnosticism and Naturalism*, has taken the great evolutionist very severely to task for leaving two great gaps in his Synthetic Philosophy. The fact is, any theory of evolution which seeks to account for and "ideally construct" the changes of the universe by some assumption as to a primitive state of homogeneity is doomed to failure.

Another characteristic of Mr. Spencer's system is its claim to be thoroughly scientific. Evolutional ethics is of necessity experiential ethics, for according to the evolutionist it is only experience that furnishes us with the test of moral conduct. If this is so, in what respect does Mr. Spencer differ from older experiential moralists, such as Bentham, Mill, and others? In the first place, the evolutionist, when he speaks of experience, would

mean the experience of the race and not of the individual. As Mr. Spencer puts it, the "experiences of utility, organized and consolidated during all past generations of the human race, have been producing nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experience of utility." This view, though it is put forward as affording a reconciliation between Intuitionism and Experientialism, will, if closely examined, prove to be ultimately a thoroughgoing experiential theory. In another respect also Mr. Spencer differs from the older empiricists. He brings a charge against them for not applying rigorously the scientific method to ethics. He takes them to task for stopping at the empirical stage and not proceeding to the deductive stage. He agrees with them in judging actions by their results, but according to him they fail to show why some classes of actions necessarily produce happiness and others misery, and his aim is to supply the deficiency. It is in answering this question, he says, that we have to seek the aid of Biology, Sociology, and other sciences. He compares the empirical generalizations of Mill and others to the observations by which ancient astronomers were enabled to predict the positions of the heavenly bodies with merely an approach to accuracy, before Newton came and by discovering the law of gravitation showed that these bodies must occupy certain places at certain times.

There is no doubt of the fact that Mr. Spencer is more consistent in his application of the scientific method than Mill, and in making such an application he is following the modern tendency which the late T. H. Green alluded to as consisting in the physical science treatment of the subject. The true scientific method is not the empirical method, it is the empirical method supplemented by the deductive. But then the question arises: Does ethics lend itself to the physical science treatment? Are not the phenomena with which we have to deal in ethics of a unique nature? Observation and generalization will only give us existing or past conduct; they will only furnish us with facts; but in ethics we want something more than facts, we want *judgment on facts*, we want ideals. "A scientific treatment of morality," says Sidgwick, "means merely an investigation of the laws according to which ethical beliefs and sentiments of our own or any other society have come into existence, but though such an investigation is a legitimate branch of Socio-

logy or Psychology, it does not establish the authority of the morality of which it explains the existence."

First let us notice some of the errors Mr. Spencer has fallen into by resorting to a natural science treatment of ethics. In his physical, biological, and sociological views he looks upon conduct as merely a series of outward movements or activities of biological or mechanical phenomena, omitting to take into consideration the motives and character of which these outward movements and activities are merely the superficial index. The organic view of conduct differs from the mere physical view of it in that it treats conduct as a whole, as both arising out of and forming character. The physical science treatment, moreover, has led Mr. Spencer to apply rigorously the law of causation to ethical conduct, overlooking the phenomenon of free will which stands in the way of our tracing moral conduct to its causes and also of predicting the future.

The evolutionist says that the true method of ethics is not only scientific but also historical. In order to understand any phenomenon we must know its genesis, we must fall back on the study of origins. "Given the earliest morality of which we have any written record," writes Dr. Schurmann, "to trace from it through progressive stages the morality of to-day, that is the problem and the only problem which can fall to a truly scientific ethics." Hence it is that Mr. Spencer insists on our studying human conduct as a part of animal conduct, which in its turn must be traced to its antecedents. The study of historical facts no doubt has been of great value to the moralist, inasmuch as it enables us to study moral phenomena under varying conditions; and the importance now attached to the historical method of study in ethics is largely due to the dominant influence at the present time of the idea of evolution; but, at the same time, it must not be forgotten that history can only give us *facts*, and ethical interest does not centre in *facts* but in the *interpretation of these facts*. The advocate of the historical method is a victim to the fallacious idea that the later and more complex can be explained by the earlier and the simpler, that the primitive is the primary, and the simple the essential. The historical method proceeds upon a false notion of development, *viz.*, that development must be read backwards and not forwards. This method of trying to find an explanation of the ethical ideal in primitive society has led Mr. Spencer into a serious error which we notice in his very definition of conduct. He would include all sorts of vital activities under the

term conduct, for he defines it as acts adjusted to ends. By giving such a wide definition he is of course enabled to include under the term conduct the activities of the lowest living organs such as the molluscs, but then the very essence of moral conduct is its purposiveness. We pass ethical judgment not on every kind of act adjusted to an end,—in that case we should be justified in passing an ethical judgment on a machine,—but only on *purposeful* activities, or, to use Kant's expression, activity directed by an *idea* of an end. The essence of virtue lies in the Will, and a "good will," as Kant puts it, "is good not because of what it performs or effects, not by its aptness for the attainment of some proposed end, but simply by virtue of the volition." Throughout the *Data of Ethics*, excepting in the chapter on 'The Psychological View', Mr. Spencer neglects this essential aspect of moral conduct, and the error is due to his rigid application of the historical method to problems of ethics.

There is yet another danger arising from placing too great confidence in the historical method. It fosters the belief that morality is something relative and arbitrary, and this conception is very strongly rooted in Mr. Spencer, for the second Part of the *Principles of Ethics*, which deals with the 'Inductions of Ethics', has for its one object the establishment of this relativity. We must, of course, admit differences in ethical codes at different times and places. "No system of medicine would commend opium and crushed feet, and no system of ethics would regard with equal approval the Code of Honour, the Ten Commandments, and the Sermon on the Mount, but all these are *ethical facts* and have an equal right to be chronicled as such, though they have not an equal right to be approved. There is a marked difference, therefore, between the science which deals with the *facts* of the moral life and that which deals with the *rules* and *ideals* of the moral life." There is a tendency in the evolutionist to mistake *what is* for *what ought to be*, and as pointed out above the root of this serious error lies in taking for granted that ethics can be subjected to a purely scientific and historical treatment.

Mr. Spencer, though differing in some respects from empirical utilitarians of the school of Mill, is yet a thoroughgoing Hedonist. The good is the pleasurable,—this is the fundamental idea underlying his whole system. The proof of this fundamental position, which he gives in Chapter III. on 'Good and Bad Conduct', is far from satisfactory. After defining the term conduct

as the "adjustment of acts to ends," he points out the difference between the acts of the lower animals and those of more evolved creatures. The former are relatively simple and relatively incomplete, whilst the latter are more complex and better adjusted to ends. What is the end which evolution points to as *the one* end which all living creatures are trying to realise? It is the continuance of life, measured not merely by length but also by breadth, that is, we must take into account the different "quantities of change" that different beings pass through in the same period of time. In one word, promotion of life is the ultimate end—life not only of the individual but of others as well. The next step Mr. Spencer takes is to identify conduct that tends to make "the lives of each and all the greatest possible, alike in length and breadth," with conduct of which the ultimate moral aim is "gratification, enjoyment, happiness." Of course there is here "an assumption of great significance" involved, and that is that life "brings a surplus of agreeable feeling." If it were not for this there would be no justification whatever for judging conduct to be good that conduces to mere life-preservation. There is, therefore, an underlying optimism in Mr. Spencer's system, which is, however, quietly assumed without any attempt at proof. Well may Professor Sidgwick say:—"We expect a scientific confutation of pessimism, and I am unable to perceive that this expectation is ever adequately realised. Indeed I am unable to find any passage in which Mr. Spencer expressly undertakes such a confutation. And yet he can hardly think that pessimism is sufficiently confuted by demonstrating that the common moral judgments of mankind imply the assumption that life on the average yields a surplus of pleasure over pain. This is not establishing morality on a scientific basis; such an appeal to commonsense merely indicates the *pis aller*, the provisional support, with which moralists have to content themselves when they cannot provide a scientific basis for their doctrines."

It may be said that Mr. Spencer falls back upon the law of self-conservation for the refutation of pessimism. Those individuals and communities who make pleasure their supreme end are the fittest to survive; and therefore evolution is on the side of optimism, for we have as an inevitable deduction from the hypothesis of evolution the law that "necessarily throughout the animate world at large pains are the correlatives of actions injurious to the organism, while pleasures are the correlatives of actions conducive to its welfare."

But this law of conservation is not yet an established fact. Mr. Spencer himself recognizes exceptions to this law, where beneficial results are preceded by disagreeable states of consciousness and injurious results follow the receipt of certain gratifications. He explains these exceptions as due to misadjustments arising during the transition from one stage of evolution to another, and as evolution is not complete as yet, this is the same thing as saying that the law of self-conservation does not apply fully to the present stage of development.

Passing over the difficulty that arises from Mr. Spencer's identification of life-preserving acts with pleasure-producing acts, let us take for granted that the ultimate test or criterion of conduct is happiness or pleasure. The term pleasure is used in different senses by the great evolutionist. When, at the beginning, he identifies the 'good' with the 'pleasurable' he uses the latter term in its legitimate sense of agreeable sensation, but later on, when he speaks of pleasure derived from altruistic actions, and puts forward this also as a test or criterion of right conduct, he is using the term in the sense of "satisfied consciousness," which refers to *ideal* and not to *actual* pleasures. It is true Mr. Spencer does not raise the question that Mill raised, namely, whether qualitative differences in pleasures should be recognized by the Hedonist ? Without raising the question he quietly assumes qualitative differences. It is needless here to point out that this recognition of qualitative differences is fatal to Hedonism.

There is one argument which Mr. Spencer is very fond of using in order to prove that the good is nothing but the pleasurable. He asks whether virtues, such as speaking the truth, chastity, benevolence, &c., would still be looked on as virtues did their practice produce pain instead of pleasure, and contrariwise whether certain vices would still retain the name if their effects were reversed. To this the anti-hedonist would reply: Even granting that good actions lead to pleasure, we have no right to say because they lead to pleasure that therefore they are good. It may be the other way; because they are good therefore they lead to happiness. The coincidence of goodness and pleasure may be the result of a preordained arrangement. Moreover, if Mr. Spencer's argument is to be carried to its logical conclusion we must identify every action that leads to pleasure, such as taking a walk, or eating a dinner, with the ethically right, but we know that this is not the case, for the sphere of utility or pleasure is wider than the sphere of virtue.

But there is yet a more serious objection to the theory that resolves the good into the pleasurable. Whose pleasure are we to take into consideration? Is it the pleasure to self or the pleasure to others? The physical and the biological tests that Mr. Spencer applies to conduct refer to pleasure to self, but the sociological test is pleasure to others, and these two tests conflict with each other. Mr. Spencer is fully aware of the difficulty and hence he devotes a great deal of attention to the problem of the reconciliation of Egoism with Altruism. Four chapters of his *Data of Ethics* are taken up with the discussion of the claims of Egoism and Altruism, but after all that is said the reconciliation is far from satisfactory. We must, no doubt, give credit to the evolutionist for bringing the individual and society into closer reciprocal dependence, but even Mr. Spencer admits that the course of human development has not as yet reached the point at which actual harmony between the race and each member of it is established, and so long as this identifica-cation is manifestly incomplete, there will of necessity be a conflict between the interests of self and the interests of others. The question naturally arises whether we have to be guided by Egoism or by Altruism. The principle of evolution implies the struggle for existence; the continued existence of conflict and competition is essential for development; and so long as these factors exist there will be no chance of a compromise being arrived at between Egoism and Altruism. Besides, Altruism may take various forms. It may take the form of devotion to family or to clan or to race or to humanity; and as one of the results of a complex civilization is to multiply cliques and sets and societies with antagonistic interests, there is a chance, as evolution proceeds, of Altruism taking countless forms unknown to society of a simpler type. Mr. Spencer himself admits this when he regards 'heterogeneity' as the characteristic of a higher stage of evolution. There will be therefore not merely a conflict between Egoism and Altruism, but endless conflicts between one form of Altruism and another. Instead, therefore, of there being any chance of a reconciliation there will be greater discord of interests as evolution proceeds. In a state of Utopia, in that ideal state which Mr. Spencer is looking forward to, there may be no difference between *meum* and *tuum*, but we do not appear to be much nearer that goal now than our ancestors were while in their savage state. The fact is Mr. Spencer gives us two antagonistic tests of conduct—pleasure to self and pleasure to others; and he has failed to show that these tests are in harmony with each other.

Though greatest pleasure is "the ultimately supreme end," for practical purposes it should not be made the immediate aim of conduct. The relativity and the incommensurability of pleasures, coupled with the indeterminateness of the means required to reach so indeterminate an end, prevent our making this the immediate aim of conduct. The empirical utilitarian who attempts to arrive at ethical principles by an estimate of the consequences of actions, is therefore entirely wrong. Another and a more effective method is open to us, and that is "to deduce from the laws of life and the conditions of existence what kinds of actions necessarily tend to produce happiness and what kinds to produce unhappiness." But the question arises: By having recourse to the deductive method do we arrive at ends which work better in our hands than pleasure as an end? In the chapter on the 'Physical View' we are told that the moral man is "one in whom the *moving equilibrium* is perfect;" the biological test of conduct is *promotion of life in its length and its breadth*; the psychological test is *guidance by representative to the exclusion of presentative feelings,* and the sociological test is the *promotion of social well-being.* Surely these four tests are not in any way more determinate than that of pleasure. Whatever uncertainty besets the hedonistic end extends with even greater force to the physical, psychological, sociological, and biological ends.

One more essential feature of Mr. Spencer's system of Ethics must be mentioned here, and that is his conception of Absolute Ethics. Ethical science, according to him, should not only formulate ideal conduct but it should formulate the ideal conduct of men in an ideal society. If we deal with right and wrong conduct with reference to existing society, we are dealing only with relative Ethics. The advantage of going beyond the empirical stage is to be able to predict the ideal conduct in an ideal state of society towards which evolution is tending. In this ideal society conduct will "produce pure pleasure unalloyed with pain anywhere." Other evolutional moralists, such as Leslie Stephen, S. S. Alexander, have repudiated this Absolute Ethics altogether and for proper reasons too. In the first place Mr. Spencer does not formulate a sufficiently definite conception of the constitution of this ideal society to enable us to frame a system of rules for it. He merely vaguely states that in this ideal society the interests of the individual will become identical with the interests of all. This, beyond being a vague assumption, does not lead us logically to a precise and consistent conception of the mutual relations of the members of this ideal society.

Professor Sidgwick has criticized this conception of Absolute Ethics very effectively. "It seems," he says, "that when we abandon the firm ground of actual society we have an illimitable cloudland surrounding us on all sides in which we may construct any variety of pattern states; but no definite ideal to which the actual undeniably approximates as the straight lines and circles of the actual physical world appoximate to those of scientific geometry." Moreover, even if we succeed in constructing the ideal code which will be applicable to the ideal society which Mr. Spencer has in view, it would not be of much avail in solving the practical problems of actual humanity.

Closely connected with this conception of Absolute Ethics is Mr. Spencer's peculiar view of obligation. Plain-spoken Bentham, finding the idea of 'oughtness' a serious difficulty in the way of his resolving the good into the pleasurable, treated it as a relic of superstition, and made short work of it by proposing to banish the word 'ought' from the English vocabulary, but Mr. Spencer, more considerate, regards the feeling of obligation as something merely transitory and as capable of vanishing entirely when society reaches its ideal goal of evolution. His whole object is to expunge from the moral experience every element other than that which is found in the sentient, and prove that the latter is adequate, without any addition, to give a complete account of the former. Doing altruistic actions will become as natural and instinctive as a child's drawing its nourishment from its mother. All that we can say to this view is that if such a state is ever reached then there will be no scope for the practice of morality in it, and the very expression 'Absolute *Ethics*' will become meaningless.

In conclusion we may say, in the words of Dr. Martineau, that so long as evolutional ethics "sets itself to find the moral in the unmoral, to identify the *order of right* with the *order of strength*, to repudiate any study of what *ought to be* except in studying what has been, is, and will be, it totally shuts the door in the face of all conception and possibility of Duty, and by *naturalising Ethics* reverses the idealising process, which rather *ethicises Nature.*"

S. Satthianadhan.

THE FOUNDATION OF MORALS*:—II.

The verdict of commonsense is often truer than that of current science on questions bearing directly on human nature—especially on questions of morality and religion; and it may therefore be given some consideration. The solution given by commonsense of the problem under investigation is even simpler and more satisfactory than the theological. To the first of our two pertinent questions—How are we or can we be moral?—commonsense gives the simple answer that we are moral if we act up to the specific rules of conduct dictated by our conscience; and to the second question,—Why are we or should we be moral—it answers that the existence of conscience in us is itself a sufficient reason for our conforming to such rules. The function of conscience seems to be generally two-fold, legislative and executive, as it dictates certain laws and carries them duly into effect, with its own system of sanctions of punishments and rewards, unique of their kind. A third function, namely, the judicial, is sometimes allotted to it in cases of perplexity. The government of conscience is universal, and the laws administered under it are those of humanity. Every individual is so directly under the supervision of the supreme dictator that he cannot violate the laws without detection and just punishment. The court of conscience is the supreme divine court of justice, where justice between man and man is most efficiently dealt out—a court to which we have to make the final appeal, if the offender should escape with impunity from the operation of laws administered by courts of justice established by Government, or from social punishment before the court of the people; but to which we should make advisedly, by a systematic moral education, the earliest appeal, if wrongs and offences to humanity are to be directly and effectively checked at their very source. Conscience is the sole supreme ruler in the kingdom of morals, of which we are subjects. It rules over us not by might but by right. It does not compel men but furnishes light and guidance for even the unwary traveller, to whom, however, because he is unwary, its light flickers and its voice fades into faint and indistinct murmurs. It is a stern ruler, governing men not by solicitation and inducement, but by virtue of its divine authority. At times it plays the part of confessor and grants free pardon on

* A lecture delivered in the College Hall, Trivandrum.

repentance. Conscience makes cowards of us all, being a living witness of all we think, say, and do. We dare not boldly infringe its laws. It is indeed a formidable power. While it has irretrievably wrecked the lives of many who have unpardonably offended its sovereign dignity, driving them to madness and despair, it has also saved the souls of many who have followed its lead, faithful and loving, from the shallows and miseries of this world, and brought them to the haven of pure and serene blissfulness. The voice of conscience is verily the voice of God. Such is the verdict of commonsense about conscience regarded as the central point of morality. We gather, then, that conscience is a stern reality in moral life, that it lives and glows in the bosom of every individual, and makes him perceive and do the right, by furnishing light and guidance, by strengthening his moral fibre, and by pricking him to the quick when he sins against the moral laws. Such, in brief, is the account which commonsense philosophy gives of morality and its sanction, and of the nature and government of conscience. But I believe that conscience in such integrity is rarely to be found in actual life, and we have here, therefore, an account of the working of conscience in an ideal moral life, of which only a few examples may be found in actual experience.

As to the existence of conscience in actual life there is not the least doubt. We have the strongest assurance from Mr. Leslie Stephen that it exists as undeniably as hunger, cold, and heat. The question is, Where does it exist, how does it come into existence, and when? What is its nature and strength generally as it is found in actual life? It makes itself felt undeniably in the average individual of a well-constituted society. It appears at its best in those who, having undergone the strictest moral discipline in early years, realise in themselves, by virtue of rigid self-control, the ideal of a moral life at any time set before the society of which they form part. But this is by no means the absolutely best; for the ideal of a progressive society is itself progressive. As to its nature and strength I may say that the conscience of the average individual on the side of feeling as a moving influence is not as strong as it is clear and emphatic in its judgments regarding moral distinctions of right and wrong. Nor is this strange. The executive administration under any government is never so efficient as the legislative, for it is only natural that the law presenting the ideal should be in advance of practice. But since the mainspring of a moral life consists in the fulness, intensity, and purity of the feeling

of reverence for the moral laws, and since refinements and distinctions in morals are altogether useless without the corresponding impulse to give them effect in practice, conscience on the side of the executive has come to be regarded as the whole of conscience, as the executive government is commonly looked upon as the whole government. Men in whom the feeling side is weak—by whom no satisfaction in doing the right nor compunction in doing the opposite is felt, pass for men without conscience; and it can be easily imagined how when the feeling side tends to weaken, the intellectual will follow suit. The man who does not care to be moral will not see whether it is right or wrong to do a thing before he does it. As feeling thus becomes paralysed under adverse influences, intellect becomes blinded by disuse.

A careful observer can see that all wrongs done by man to man are cases of either weak or erring conscience. The most inhuman deeds are perpetrated when conscience has become torpid or permanently stifled. Every individual is moral or immoral as the light of his conscience waxes or wanes. The conscience of man is made or marred according to the influences brought to bear on him from without. This view, however, is shocking to the commonsense philosopher, who fears that conscience, if not altogether original and perfect on the affective as well as on the perceptive side, would lose its authority, and morality its sanctity and validity. The fear is vague, ungrounded, and sentimental. It is as unreasonable to fear that one with a healthy conscience would cast it away on being told that he did not possess that conscience, in that form, from his birth, as to expect a wealthy man to abandon his wealth on being told that he did not own it when he was born; and it is as impossible to make a man conscientious by saying he has a conscience when he has none, as to prolong the life of a dying patient, by telling him that he is healthy and has no disease. If we acknowledge the fact openly that some men have no conscience or have stifled their conscience, is it to be feared that others will take a lesson from them, or does it follow that conscience is an unnatural and artificial growth? Certainly not. The truth is, conscience when sufficiently strengthened as character once formed, cannot be easily undone. Every man bears till the last moment of his life the character that has been formed during the plastic period from infancy to manhood. We cannot sacrifice truth for the sake of retaining a sentiment, especially as we lose more than we gain by so doing. If the aim of moral education ultimately is to awaken,

elaborate, and develop the conscience of the individual, we must analyse the mature and healthy conscience into its constituents and trace the laws and conditions of its growth and development. As I cannot attempt an analysis of conscience without anticipating certain views which it is the object of this paper to establish, I reserve the analysis to the end, where I shall try to show that conscience is a natural growth.

For my present purpose it is enough to describe the general nature of conscience as it exists in the average individual, since that will help us in our examination of commonsense views on morality. On the side of intellect, conscience as it legislates is but the commonsense of the individual sitting in judgment on the conduct and experience of men in society. But what is the commonsense of the individual except the internal reflection of the public sense of the community? And the public sense has at no time been altogether arbitrary in its judgments. It is really the good sense of the people awakened by the whole experience of the past consolidated by human reason. When I say that the public sense is not altogether arbitrary it is implied that it is somewhat so. As long as man not only reasons but feels, no individual, even with the widest experience, accustomed to the free exercise of reason, can be altogether free from certain fancies which develop at times into personal idiosyncrasies; but it is to be remembered that the fancies do not float away or fly loose from the stable part of his character formed by regular habits of thought and action. What is true of the individual so far is also true of the social body, which has its own special sentiments. But these, being the outcome of the common fancies of the members of society, are not based on rational or strictly moral experience. They are expressive of, and perfectly consistent with, the whole character of society at any stage of its progress. Since the character of a whole society, however, has greater stability than that of an individual, and since the sentiments, consistent with such character, are points towards which the fancies of individuals converge, but from which the special sentiments of individuals diverge, the character and sentiments of a whole society cannot be impeached by the average member of the society. Still the moralist cannot omit to point out that the public sense, or the common conscience generally, mixes up strictly moral judgments with those which are non-moral and purely sentimental.

On the emotional side conscience, as it glows with satisfaction or inflicts pain according as the moral laws are obeyed or disobeyed,

is but a peculiar taste of the individual. On the side of pleasure it is akin to complacence, the sense of elevation and honour, and on the side of pain it is the sense of depression and shame. Here, too, the individual relish or disrelish invariably attaching to actions conformable or non-conformable to the judgments of commonsense, is but the reflection of the public taste. The individual approves what the society approves and condemns and what it condemns. It may be pointed out that the same feeling of satisfaction or pain attaches alike to morality and sentiment with almost the same intensity, so that they are hardly distinguishable. I do not propose to explain further the origin and constitution of the public sense. I shall only remark that the public sense of society is only the ready-made and fully developed sense of the individual, but for which it would be impossible to understand how the individual could appropriate and make the public conscience his own or how such a perfect identity between the sense of society and the individual sense could be established.

Next, to illustrate the confusion of morality and sentiment in judgments passed by the individual and society on the conduct of persons, praising and blaming as it pleases or displeases them, commonsense disapproves of and whenever possible severely condemns and brands with disgrace conduct which deviates even slightly from common habits and customs sanctioned by mere sentiment. To any one who observes from a perfectly rational and universal point of view, it is of no consequence whatever whether an individual is a Christian or a Hindu by religion, a European or an Indian by birth, or whether he adopts the English or the native style of living, as long as he holds rational and sound views on subjects of such vital importance as morality, religion, and politics, and acts up to his convictions, wherever his lot may be cast. And yet the individual is ashamed, though only for a time, and the public censures him, who deviates from the habits, customs, and fashions sanctioned by usage among his people; as when a Hindu prefers the European costume to the native, or when a Brahman leaves off chewing betel and takes to smoking, or, ceasing to be a vegetarian, lives on animal diet, or when a Hindu of any sect, Brahman or Sudra, abandons the customary mode of trimming and combing his hair in favour of the English or Muhammadan, or when one departing from the usual mode of saluting or doing respect to his elders and superiors, takes to a novel and foreign mode of doing so. While the individual is constantly assuring himself that he is doing

nothing intrinsically wrong, and at last overcomes the sense of shame, the public is ever suspicious that he is going to the bad, and that if he is not positively immoral, he is prone to be so. Again, the individual feels keenly the sense of shame and the public do not spare him who, quitting the profession followed by his family or peculiar to his race, takes to a new one even though he may have special aptitude for it and may derive more profit than from the old, and thus, while doing good to himself, render valuable service to the art and to the public; as when, a Brahman or high-caste Sudra takes to the plough or any of the mechanical arts, not to speak of other professions positively ignoble in the public estimation. At a time when the distinctions of caste were rigidly observed on the original principle of profession, and the sole profession of the Brahman was literary and religious, that of the Vysia agricultural and commercial, and that of the Kshatriya military, it was most unbecoming and scandalous on the part of any member of any caste to quit his own profession and encroach on the profession of another. Now looking around, we find that these ancient landmarks have been swept away. Though the distinctions of caste are still kept up, the original fetters that clogged men's steps in the walks of life in the direction of progress have been broken. Now, within certain limits, free competition in any profession is allowed to all, irrespective of caste or creed, which if not positively sanctioned by sentiment at least is not opposed by it. Real progress can be made only by breaking through sentiment, individual or social. What is the real hindrance to many of our practical social reforms, widow marriage, for one, but social sentiment? To break through such sentiment is the work of time and calls forth the indefatigable energy of men who to the strength of their conviction and their purity of character add strength of will and moral courage. If I am right so far, the young reformers who are making such wonderful progress, I mean those who are moulding the fashion and refining the tastes of the rising generation, in the matter of dress and living, are to be admired for the strength of their convictions no less than for their moral courage. But the public still suspects and will justly continue to suspect whether the convictions of these individuals are not shallow, whether their moral courage is not simply strong fancy for the new and callousness to the overpowering public sentiment, fastened on the old, and whether there is not a vicious element in their character, until their whole character comes out in its true light and by its great-

ness and rationality causes the public to change its opinion regarding them and their ways. For the fancies and sentiments of the individual and society are both functions of the whole character; and the nature of man being organic, any change in fancy or sentiment which apparently plays on the outside, points to a deeper change within, a re-adjustment of the whole character which may tend to the right or the wrong in conduct. The public have no standard to go by, except their own, the social sentiments being perfectly consistent with the character of society.

We may then conclude that the public sense is right in its judgments regarding the average individual, though it may be wrong in exceptional cases, and that therefore the average individual of a society, to be moral, will have to attune his individual sense to the general sense of such society, which is really a composite of reason and sentiment. Although there is a certain admixture of morality and sentiment, the judgment of individuals and the public conscience enable us for all practical purposes to draw a clear line between the strictly moral and the sentimental. There is perfect agreement as to the nature and scope of morality and as to the special virtues. Morality is not individual but common. What is moral for one individual to do or abstain from doing must be so for all. Truth, justice, benevolence, temperance, chastity, are virtues clearly recognised and practised, at least to some extent, by all men. The practical commonsense of the individual, which furnishes not so much rules as particular judgments, guides him aright in the generality of cases. For the average individual, therefore, the commonsense view of morality is the most suitable. But for want of one comprehensive principle connecting the different virtues, for lack of a definite standard or criterion of morality which can be obtained only by philosophical analysis, the common conscience is perplexed in the extreme in special cases, and often recognises a number of exceptions to the recognised virtues, which themselves do not come under any rule. To take some commonsense judgments: Which is right, to give or to refuse a certificate of character to a promising young man, whose moral conduct is not altogether unquestionable, but who, it may be hoped, will mend his ways, when the production of such certificate will, by securing him some employment save him from anxiety and trouble? Commonsense may bring much discredit on the man who gives such a certificate on demand, for the false statement it contains as to a matter of fact or the suppression of part of the truth; and it may equally scorn him

who would be so cruel, uncharitable, and unkind as to refuse to give one under such circumstances. Again, commonsense pronounces it unjust on the part of a father to make an unequal distribution of property amongst his children from considerations of their character, present conditions, past benefits received, and future prospects, especially when they are entitled by law to have equal shares. The same commonsense holds it just and proper for a father to make over half of his wealth to charitable uses, dividing the rest equally among his sons to the exclusion of his daughters. Commonsense pronounces it benevolent on the part of a man even to lend money and to help his neighbour out of his difficulties, and counts it uncharitable on the part of the same individual to realise the sum lent, though at great loss to himself, if that should involve his neighbour once more in difficulties. Thrift and economy according to the popular impression are practised as long as one's expenses do not outrun one's means, irrespective of all other considerations. When the expenses of an individual fall very far short of his income, the public, instead of crediting him with prudence, despise him as a miser, and miserliness is often regarded as a vice. If miserliness is a vice, extravagance not bordering on ruin often passes for virtue, even when it does not imply the least benevolence. A man is judged to be prudent as long as he does not seek help from others, even under necessity. He loses that virtue the moment he is driven by necessity to look to others for favour or help. To refuse help to one who has by utter improvidence ruined himself would often be regarded as the height of inhumanity. Commonsense ascribes perfect purity to the man and woman who being legally married are yet the most wretched profligates. They are regarded as chaste if they are faithful to their marriage vows. They are regarded as unchaste if the marriage is not legalised, although they may be faithful as husband and wife. The widow who marries a second time is looked upon with suspicion but not the widower. While it is thought not unchaste for a man to have any number of wives where polygamy is legal, it is generally regarded as unchaste for a woman to have more than one husband. Our examination so far shows that the common conscience is unable to decide and is often positively mistaken in its judgments in special cases.

Let us next question commonsense on the point of sanction and find what reason it furnishes to the individual for fulfilling the rules of morality defined with some distinctness and clearness by it.

The voice of commonsense is clear and decisive on the matter. No reason can be given why virtue should be practised, but that it is virtue; in other words virtue must be practised for its own sake and not for the sake of any ulterior object. If it is practised for any sake at all, it is for conscience' sake. At the same time, almost every man regards happiness, whatever that may mean (and its meaning varies with different individuls), as the only rational end of life. If happiness is the only rational principle of human action, the pursuit of virtue would seem to be irrational. But commonsense does not view it in that light. Attaching equal, if not greater, value, to virtue than to happiness, commonsense is ever trying to satisfy itself that the greatest happiness is a necessary concomitant of the highest virtue. And while some men actually do and others do not find happiness in virtue, as their character and conception of happiness vary, others fully believe that if one will but carefully calculate, virtue will be found to produce the maximum of happiness attainable in any given case under given conditions. Anyhow, it is evident that commonsense distinguishes two distinct principles in human nature, namely, virtue and happiness, love or benevolence, and self-love or self-interest, which while coinciding at certain points diverge at others. Then the two principles conflict with each other. When virtue, instead of producing happiness tends to do the reverse, commonsense requires us to subordinate self-love to general benevolence by sacrificing our happiness for the sake of virtue. Thus the respective claims of our twofold nature, rational and moral, or rather, sensitive and rational, animal and human, are clearly recognised and duly adjusted by commonsense. The truest ideal of a moral life is thus clearly elicited. It consists in the perfect balancing of the diverse functions bestowed by nature upon man and in the due fulfilment of duties to self, to others, and to God, all of which, in a certain sense are duties to self. But since the animal part always asserts itself and often unduly, moralists have always dwelt only on one side, the naturally weaker but nobler, and insisted on self-renunciation and sacrifice for the sake of benevolence, ranging in its scope from the family, to which every individual is naturally attached, to the entire human race. Commonsense is equally clear in its estimate concerning the relative importance of the different virtues. It singles out benevolence as the supreme virtue, and regards self-sacrifice as the ground or root virtue, a necessary condition for the fulfilment of duties to self no less than of those we owe to others.

To conclude this part of the subject, the description given at the outset of conscience and its working gives us the true ideal of a government under which man knows no virtue he does not practise and no vice he does not avoid, and under which no man confounds right with wrong or virtue with vice; a government which, when established, will, superseding all external government and authority, furnish perfect security for the rights of person and property and afford the most favourable conditions for human progress on the lines marked out by Providence consistently with the evolution of the universe. The best living guide for the average individual who would advance in the right direction is the public conscience. A really practicable ideal is readily furnished to any careful observer of human nature and experience in the harmonising of the different parts of human nature. Morality is generally mixed up with sentiment; but for all practical purposes our commonsense draws a sufficiently clear line between the two, as we have seen it does between religion and morality. Though often perplexed in the extreme in special cases, it serves us perfectly in the generality of cases. And the perplexities of common conscience that arise in its special applications point to the dubious and indefinite character of commonsense morality and make it highly desirable to rationalise it and elicit a working formula, for the clearer discrimination and definition of virtues and duties. But the definte results thus far obtained, though only of a general kind regarding commonsense judgment, the nature of moral sanction, and the moral ideal, are not invalidated and cannot be surrendered. On the whole it is evident that the commonsense philosophy of morals goes deeper, is clearer, and more advanced, and more readily gains conviction, than the theological, as it directly appeals to the higher nature of man. Whatever be the difference between the theological and the commonsense views as to the ultimate nature of sanction, they both point to a sanction other than the direct happiness of the individual, and therefore, according to one acceptation of the term, other than rational, whether we call it non-rational, ultra-rational, or divine.

We cannot omit from an account of commonsense morality the consideration of some of the practical maxims of conduct relied on by commonsense. The Christian maxim, "Do unto others as thou wouldst be done unto," which most readily appeals to commonsense, has the rare merit of expressing at once a rule of conduct and a sanction for it; for, while it enjoins an impartial regard for

the feelings, desires, and inclinations of all alike and requires the merging of individual interests in those of the community, it induces the individual to carry out the injunctions, by appealing directly and efficaciously to his feelings. The earliest moral lessons given to children are based on this principle. We have only to ask the child prone to inflict injury on others how it would like to have the same thing done to it. The representation of pain felt by another consequent on his mischief, which is itself painful in some degree, and the fear of being dealt with in like manner if he were to persist in the same course of action, afford a sanction powerful enough to deter him from wrong. Since the vast majority of men are endowed with sympathy, hope, and fear, which can he worked up to the proper pitch, the argument is sufficiently convincing to make them truthful and benevolent, and to feel if they only wish, as they always do, that if others should not injure them, they should not injure others; that if others should help them in need, they should themselves help others in need; that if others should speak the truth and never deceive them, they should be honest and truthful to others. But the feelings of fear, sympathy, and hope of reciprocity, which are always sufficient incentives to morality with the average individual, who is weak, poor, and honest, often fail to have any effect with the strong, the rich, and the wicked. The strong man who inflicts injury on another rarely thinks of the possibility of any injury to himself from others; but would be only happy to be helped by others whom he would also help in a like cause. The rich man can hardly realise a situation in which he would be so destitute as to depend upon others for help; he thinks only of one in which he would require the services of others, for which payment would be made. He only cares for the esteem and regard of men in a like position and will be prepared to please them in the way best calculated to secure his object. The villain knows too well how to deal with those who dare to deceive him, to wish that truth should be spoken to *him*. Of course he would be glad to have accomplices to help him in his villainy, whose services he would faithfully return. The maxim is evidently a rule of benevolence based on self-love and applies to the purest morality, the scope of which is as wide as humanity itself, as well as to the shallow morality of a sect, clan, or tribe. It leaves untouched one great department of morality relating to self, which is not ignored but only subordinated by Christian morality to the virtue of benevolence. The Hindu maxim, आत्मवत्सर्वभूतानि यः पश्यति सपण्डितः (ആത്മവത്സർവ്വ

താനി യഃ പശ്യതി സ പണ്ഡിതഃ)—" Have the same regard for others as you have for yourself," or " Serve others as you serve yourself," or " Do unto others as you do unto yourself,"—expresses the same rule and conveys the same sense as the Christian maxim stripped of its sanction, which is uncertain, as every sanction must be that appeals to men's feeling and inclination, but with its own special sanction from reason; for wisdom or rationality is the tribute that is paid to one who has the same regard for all else as he has for himself. Both alike point to the supreme place of benevolence among the virtues for which alone a rule is formulated. A maxim that is more frequently in the mouth of a Hindu is, *Ahimsa paramo dharmah*—" Abstention from injury to life is the best among virtues." I should rather regard it as the first virtue and have the reading, *Ahimsa prathamo dharmah.* For it is but the negative virtue of benevolence, and it seems to me that the positive act of benevolence is not only more important than the negative but alone constitutes virtue proper, or, as sometimes the distinction is drawn, while the one constitutes duty, the other alone makes virtue. Probably simple abstention from injury is regarded as the highest virtue, for the reason that in this Kali age even that is too much to expect.

S. SUBRAHMANYA SASTRI.

LITERARY NOTICES.

Twelve Pioneer Missionaries. By George Smith, C.I.E., LL.D. London, Edinburgh, and New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1900.

IT will be a striking testimony to the interest taken in missionary work if this book obtains a wide circulation. For the author has done very little beyond conceiving the idea of the book and securing the photographs which illustrate it to give it a fair chance of success. There is little discrimination shown in the choice of subjects; the arrangement within the chapters shows scarcely a glimmer of biographical skill; there is a strange looseness of grasp; and the sentence-construction is simply appalling. A large proportion of the pages are disfigured by at least one sentence loosely put together or ambiguously worded. For example, we open at random and read: " The immediate

expense was found to be above £600, and that owing to Mrs. Marshman's 'greatest frugality.'" We open the book again and read: "She (the transport *Hillsborough*) sailed in company with the *Duff* which took out the second party of forty missionaries to the Pacific, only to be captured by a French privateer near Rio Janeiro." We turn the page and read: "His life threatened by Nggika, the chief, and deserted by his companion Edmonds. . . Vanderkemp turned to the Hottentots." We open again in the later chapters of the book and after a description of the Scots Church at Aden read: "Notwithstanding the change of the British infantry regiment every year, and the fact that the artillery remain only three years, the church has not a more prosperous or hopeful congregation." Illustrations of the author's slipshod writing might be multiplied. A similar carelessness gives us within half a paragraph on page 176 Grauson, Winkleried, and battaile, for Granson, Winkelried, and bataille.

Dr. Smith's style is also vitiated by a straining after effect which lands him sometimes in error and sometimes in the ludicrous. We read, for example, how De Beer "speeded him (Vanderkemp) on his way through lions and snow-clad hills, to Graaff-Reinet." We are told that "Boniface began the Christian civilization of Germany and Europe." Indeed, all Dr. Smith's geese are swans. Thus, unless he had told us so, we should not have known that Dr. Sinker was "the most learned and successful of Hebraists."

However, it takes a great deal to destroy the interest of the lives of missionaries, and through all the faults of the telling there shines out the heroism of the twelve of whom Dr. Smith writes. Perhaps of all the twelve lives that which suffers most at Dr. Smith's hands is that of Raymund Lulli. Yet who can be unmoved at the thought of the great mediæval missionary who had a faith which few Christians even to-day hold as firmly, that Islam must bend before Christ, and who in that faith gave himself to apostolic labour and to a martyr's death? Of the twelve selected for special notice, seven were missionaries in India, and of these and of Ion Keith-Falconer whom he knew personally Dr. Smith, naturally writes more instructively than of the rest. The account of Mrs. Marshman is perhaps the most valuable part of the book, but the most interesting feature is the inclusion of Nilakantha Shastri Goreh and Dhanjibai Nauroji among the twelve whose biographies are given.

Besides those already mentioned in this notice, the list of twelve includes Carey, Duff, Lacroix, and Caldwell, of Indian missionaries; Captain James Wilson, 'Pioneer in the Pacific Ocean'; and Peter Greig 'First Scottish Missionary Martyr'. The volume closes with an 'Epilogue' (or rather two) giving, first, a proof of Mr. Gladstone's devotion to missions, and secondly, what seems to be a newspaper report

of the unveiling of a cross as a memorial of Dr. Duff. The Epilogue confirms the feeling which the main part of the book creates that the volume is a poor product of the not very noble art of book-making.

The Alleged Haunting of B———House, including a Journal kept during the Tenancy of Colonel Lemesurier Taylor. Edited by A. Goodrich-Freer (Miss X) and John, Marquess of Bute, K. T. London: George Redway, 1899.

In the summer of 1897 public attention was called by an anonymous communication to the *Times* to an investigation that had been carried on during the preceding spring into the alleged 'haunting' of a house in the Highlands of Scotland. For the purpose of investigating the 'haunting' the house had been taken by some persons interested in psychical phenomena, and many guests had been invited from time to time. One of those who had been hospitably entertained had the bad taste to make 'copy' out of the doings of his hosts, and in his letter to the *Times* he held up the investigation to ridicule, maintaining that the so-called phenomena either were the result of practical joking or were due to the most commonplace causes. A considerable amount of correspondence followed, and the impression left by it was that, whatever the causes of the phenomena might be, the anonymous writer in the *Times* had not discovered them, though he had certainly revealed that he possessed very strange conceptions of the duty of a guest.

The impression left by the correspondence in the *Times* is confirmed by the perusal of the volume that Miss Freer and Lord Bute have edited. The book contains an account of the investigation carried on at Ballechin in the spring of 1897, and includes a Journal kept by Miss Freer—a well-known writer on psychical subjects—during the time she was living there. The house was taken by Colonel Taylor—late Professor of Tactics in Sandhurst— in consequence of the many stories as to its being haunted. These stories had been in circulation for years, but had renewed attention called to them by the experiences of the tenants who occupied Ballechin in 1896. During Colonel Taylor's tenancy many phenomena were experienced, and it is a record of them that this volume contains.

The phenomena experienced were of a very varied nature and occurred under conditions which made the practical joking theory an untenable one. By far the commonest were sounds of different kinds, many of them very loud. Some, however, were visual, and some were tactile. It is, perhaps, a fact worth noting that most of the visual and tactile phenomena, as also the audible phenomena which took the form of voices, were experienced by ladies living in the house or by women servants—a fact which is susceptible of different interpretations. Some of the other audible phenomena, however, were heard by almost every one who stayed in the house, and the list of guests included clergymen, soldiers, lawyers,

men of letters, business men, an artist, and a physician. After making due allowance, therefore, for the element of expectancy, which in such cases it is almost impossible wholly to eliminate, it seems difficult to resist the conclusion that there were at Ballechin many strange phenomena the causes of which are as yet unexplained. Some of the phenomena may have been hallucinations due to subjective causes, but there seems to remain an irreducible minimum that cannot be explained away in this manner.

Only three theories are possible to account for the phenomena. Either most of the guests at Ballechin were persons subject to hallucinations, or Ballechin or something about it had the power of producing hallucinations in persons otherwise free from them, or some of the phenomena were due to subjective hallucinations, while others were produced by agencies that are recognised generally as natural causes but the connection of which with the phenomena has not been traced. The first theory is in the circumstances as much out of the question as the practical joking explanation, and the choice between the other two must depend chiefly upon what one is inclined to believe as to the possibility of the existence in nature of forces of whose laws we as yet know nothing. Miss Freer and Lord Bute do not put forward any theory of their own. They have probably their own theories as to the cause and meaning of the phenomena, but they do not obtrude them. As they say in the concluding paragraph of the narrative, "the editors offer no conclusions. This volume has been put together, as the house at B——— was taken, not for the establishment of theories, but for the record of facts."

It is an easy matter to dismiss every subject of this nature with a jest, and living in the neighbourhood of the Adyar one is naturally inclined to be very chary of believing in 'phenomena'. Still it is a great mistake, because imposture and charlatanism have often been rampant in connection with the manifestation and investigation of psychical phenomena, to dismiss the whole subject as unworthy of attention, and to dogmatically assert that there cannot be phenomena the causes of which we as yet understand only vaguely or, it may be, not at all. So far, therefore, from scoffing at those who interest themselves in psychical phenomena, we should welcome their efforts provided that their investigations are carried on in a truly scientific spirit and not with a view to proving a presupposed theory or to making money out of credulous disciples.

The Early History of Charles James Fox. By the Right Hon. Sir George Otto Trevelyan, Bart. The Silver Library. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899.

WE welcome this addition to the Silver Library. It is probably

enough to say that in point of type, binding, and general get-up it is as satisfactory as earlier volumes of the series. It would be superfluous to criticise the book itself at this time of day. It has taken its place already in the historical literature of our generation. The present appears to be the ninth edition, though it has not yet been twenty years before the public. Its popularity, moreover, both deserves to be and is likely to be lasting. The only thing about it that moves regret is that it is now practically certain to remain for ever incomplete.

In commenting some months ago on the author's *American Revolution* we pointed out that that work is a kind of continuation of this Life of Fox, and suffers not a little, especially in its earlier parts, from the author's hesitation as to whether he was to continue the work before us or boldly to launch upon a larger theme. We do not profess to regret that the latter was the alternative he chose; yet it is a pity that a biography which is by universal consent so admirable as this, should remain an unfinished torso. Even as it is, however, few works of a historical character unite so much that is attractive with so much that is instructive as this appreciative and sympathetic but at the same time justly critical account of how Fox began his progress towards his high position as one of the very greatest of parliamentary statesmen.

The Works of Shakespeare. The Eversley Edition. Edited with Introductions and Notes, by C. H. Herford, Litt. D. Vols. IV., V., VI., and VII. London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1899.

In reviewing the first three volumes of this edition we took occasion to commend it as one of the most serviceable editions of Shakespeare yet published. The subsequent volumes, which have been issued with remarkable regularity, fully bear out this estimate. The Eversley edition is pre-eminently one for the general reader. It is edited, it is true, with scholarly accuracy, but the notes, while generally sufficient for a thoughtful perusal of the Plays, are too few and too brief for a critical study. Vols I. to IV., the first three of which have been already noticed, contain the Comedies. Vol. IV. comprises *Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter's Tale,* and *The Tempest,* four plays which, characterised as they are by a certain gravity of tone, are usually grouped separately under the name of Romances. The ordinary classification has, however, little to justify it, as the element of romance enters, in a greater or less degree into every comedy, and is to no appreciable extent a special feature of these four Plays. The Editor seems, therefore, right in including them among the Comedies.

Vols V., VI., and a part of VII. contain the Histories. The three parts of *Henry VI.* and *Richard III.* occupy the whole of Vol. V. *King John, Richard II.,* and *Henry IV.* (Parts I. and II.) make up Vol. VI.;

and the two remaining Histories, *Henry V.* and *Henry VIII.*, form the first part of Vol. VII. The remainder of Vol. VII. is occupied with the first two of the Tragedies, viz., *Titus Andronicus*, and *Romeo and Juliet.* The work of the editor maintains the high level characteristic of the first three volumes.

Outlines of Theoretical Chemistry. By Lothar Meyer. Translated by P. Phillips Bedson and W. Carleton Williams. Second Edition. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1899. Price 9*s*.

THIS work on chemical philosophy by one of the most distinguished chemists of the century was made available to English readers more than seven years ago and does not stand in need of either criticism or commendation. The appearance of a second edition of Messrs. Bedson and Carleton's translation may, however, be regarded as a fitting opportunity for calling the attention of our scientific readers to this able and lucid exposition of the principles of chemistry.

The nature of the book was set forth by the author in the preface which he wrote for the first edition of the English translation. In writing the work, Lothar Meyer said, he had not considered the requirements of students alone but had sought to meet the needs of those friends of scientific investigation who had neither the time nor the wish to concern themselves with the details of chemical investigation but who wished to become acquainted with the general conclusions arrived at. For this reason he abstained from too large a use of the numerical results of observations and measurements and avoided giving detailed descriptions of experimental methods. He expressed the hope that this mode of treatment would meet with approval in England, where, he said, a large number of readers interested themselves in the general results and conclusions of scientific investigations.

We may take the appearance of the second edition of the translation as a proof that the hope thus expressed has been realised. In preparing the present edition the translators have availed themselves of the second German edition, which was published in 1893, and by footnotes and appendices have sought to bring the work up to date. By permission of Sir William Crookes and the Council of the Royal Society they have been allowed to use the diagram devised by Crookes to represent the positions of argon, helium, and krypton in the scheme of the elements. It is to be regretted that the important results recently obtained by Professor Dewar had not been made public when the work was passing through the press. In view of the progress that is being made in all branches of scientific investigation, however, it has become practically impossible to issue any scientific work that shall be altogether up to

date. It is much if an important book is not allowed to fall out of date; and no one, we presume, would say that the work before us is in any sense out of date.

French History for Schools. By Katharine Stephen. London: Macmillan and Co., 1899. Price 3*s.* 6*d.*

This is probably the most inaccurate book that was ever put forth by a Cambridge official. Newnham students of history fortunately have better guides than their Vice-Principal, or their chances would be small. It is difficult to credit the fact that the book before us is an old one revised, for it shows no trace of having been read carefully through. Mistakes abound; passages in which a fact is stated in such a way as to convey a false idea are frequent; the construction is often loose; and the wording is inexact. Names and titles are apparently abandoned hopelessly to confusion. For example, Godfrey of Bouillon appears under that name and also under the names of Godfrey de Bouillon, Godfrey Duke of Bouillon, Godefroi de Bouillon, and Godefroi of Bouillon.

At times Miss Stephen must have a French word—even where it is inappropriate. She speaks, for example, of the mother-in-law of Hugh Capet as "the Impératrice Edelheide." By way of reaction she swings to the opposite extreme and we have "Catherine of Medicis." Incidentally it may be mentioned that this lady does not appear in the list of 'Wives of French Kings', though perhaps with one exception she is the most famous of them all. Never before perhaps did nomenclature show greater confusion than in the two pages of this list. Here also the husband of the Empress Eugénie is called Napoleon II. It is needless to add that the Emperors are 'Emperors of Germany' to Miss Stephen.

It is a pity Miss Stephen did not induce some one to revise the book for her. She has no wide outlook and no grasp of real politics, but has a taste for those personal and other details which help to make history interesting. And the publishers have done all they could to give the book a chance.

A First Book in Statics and Dynamics. By J. L. Robinson, M. A. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co.

Elementary Dynamics. By W. M. Baker, M.A. London: George Bell and Sons.

These two books deal with the same subject but they differ very considerably in their standard and mode of treatment. The former has been written chiefly for the use of those who are preparing to matriculate in

the University of London and for those who are reading for the elementary stage of the South Kensington examination; and it is, as it professes to be, a book for beginners. It starts with some definitions and the statement of the parallelogram of forces, of which only the experimental proof is given; and deals in order with statics, kinematics, and a few of the more elementary propositions of kinetics. The treatment of these subjects is simple and fully illustrated by examples worked out, and the book will no doubt be found well suited to the purpose for which it was written. It may be questioned, however, whether the fact that the propositions of statics are more easily mastered by beginners than those of kinematics and kinetics is sufficient justification for departing from the logical order of treatment, aud discussing the laws of motion at the end of the book. As regards order of treatment Mr. Baker's work is in our opinion much more satisfactory than Mr. Robinson's, though in fairness to Mr. Robinson it ought to be said that Mr. Baker, writing for a somewhat more advanced class of students, did not require to give so much consideration to the relative difficulty of the different parts of the subject when determining the order of treatment to be adopted.

Apart from the order of treatment adopted Mr. Baker's work has much to recommend it. It contains a good many useful things that are not to be found in the usual treatises on elementary dynamics, and it would probably serve very well as a text-book for students reading for the B.A. Degree Examination of the Madras University in Branch II. A. Students of Branch I. would also derive much benefit from a study of it.

In the chapter on units Mr. Baker makes the common mistake of assuming that units can be multiplied together and otherwise treated as numerical quantities. The symbol $[T]^2$, for example, is not really "the square of the unit of time," a phrase which has no meaning, but "the square of the measure of the unit of time expressed in terms of an arbitrarily selected unit." The remark "that all units, other than the fundamental, are called *derived* units" is also misleading. It is only in the case of a derived system of units that "all units, other than the fundamental," are "derived."

Inorganic Chemistry for Advanced Students. By Sir Henry Roscoe, F.R.S., D.C.L., LL.D., and Arthur Harden, Ph.D., M. Sc. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited.

Heat for Advanced Students. By Edwin Edser. Same Publishers.

Practical Plane and Solid Geometry for Advanced Students. By Joseph Harrison, M.I.M.E., and G. A. Baxandall. Same Publishers.

Elementary Physiology. By Benjamin Moore, M.A. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co.

A Practical Introduction to the Study of Botany. By J. B. Farmer, M.A. Same Publishers.

Elementary Practical Mathematics. By Frank Castle, M.I.M.E. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited.

Magnetism and Electricity for Beginners. By H. E. Hadley, B.Sc. Same Publishers.

Building Construction for Beginners. By J. W. Riley. Same Publishers.

Experimental Science: Physiography (Section I.). By R. A. Gregory and A. T. Simmons, B.Sc. Same Publishers.

Exercises in Practical Physics. Part I. Same Authors and Publishers.

Chemistry for Organised Schools of Science. By S. Parrish, B.Sc. Same Publishers.

Object Lessons in Elementary Science and Geography Combined. Vol. I. (Standard I.); Vol. II. (Standard II.); Vol. III. (Standard III.). By Vincent T. Murché, F.R.G.S. Same Publishers.

Object Lessons in Geography for Standards I., II., and III. By T. F. G. Dexter, B.A., B.Sc., and A. H. Garlick, B.A. London, New York, and Bombay: Longmans, Green, and Co.

To judge from the number of elementary works on science that are year by year being published it would seem that science now occupies a much more important place in the English educational system than it did twenty years ago. And to judge from the nature of many of these works it would also appear that a great change has come over the teaching of science in schools, especially in the junior classes. The practical aspects of science teaching are much more kept in view than they used to be, pupils being as far possible set to obtain a knowledge of scientific principles from experiments performed by themselves. This is as it should be. In this country it has not yet been found practicable to make any great advance in the methods of teaching science in schools, and the expense of equipping and maintaining science laboratories makes it impossible to hope for anything like rapid progress for a considerable time to come. Many of the elementary text-books written for use in English schools are therefore unsuited to the needs of Indian schools. But if Indian pupils are not yet in a position to profit from the use of text-books of experimental science, Indian teachers ought to be familiar with the most recent methods of science teaching, and we therefore commend to their notice the works named at the beginning of this note.

It is perhaps hardly necessary to state that some of the works are of a much more advanced nature than others. Roscoe and Harden's *Inor-*

ganic Chemistry and Edser's *Heat* will be found useful by students preparing for the B.A. Degree Examination in Physics and Chemistry of the Madras University, and Moore's *Elementary Physiology* may be commended to F.A. students, though it contains a great deal that is beyond their requirements. Castle's *Elementary Practical Mathematics* has been written to meet the needs of candidates for the examination in practical mathematics recently instituted by the Science and Art Department, and its object is to show how many mathematical truths may be verified by experiment instead of by the processes of abstract reasoning employed in the ordinary treatises on elementary mathematics. The plan of the book, the author says, is largely due to the inspiration of Professor Perry. The volumes on object lessons will be found useful and suggestive by teachers, though they treat largely of things that cannot yet find a place in many Indian schools.

Macmillan's Colonial Library.*

Stalky and Co. By Rudyard Kipling.

MOST if not all of the stories contained in this book have appeared during the past two years in various periodicals, and the possibility of the existence of three such boys as Stalky, Beetle, and Macturk, and of such a school as that drawn by Mr. Kipling, has been much discussed. It is difficult to see any point in such a discussion. Whether these stories are pure inventions or based on Mr. Kipling's reminiscences of of his school days is of no importance. It is sufficient that the tales are given to us by Mr. Kipling. Most people will read them with immense delight. They are unlike anything else that their versatile author has written, both in their plots and the personnel of the actors in them, for they describe some of the amazing deeds of three strange boys at a somewhat unique school. But the style in which they are written, brief, forceful, intensely graphic, at once proclaims their kinship with *Soldiers Three.* One or two of them, notably the last story in the volume descriptive of a gallant act on the North-West frontier, are written in Mr. Kipling's most brilliant manner, and all of them abound in unexpected incidents. From certain coincidences it would seem that the untidy Beetle, the literary member of the triumvirate that occupied 'No. 5 Study ', is no other than Mr. Kiplingh imself in his unregenerate schoolboy days ; and of him it is recorded, with retrospective pity, that "the life of a poet at a big school is hard." If the surmise is correct and the bespectacled Beetle is the portrait of the poet of Imperialism in an earlier stage of his evolution, he may be congratulated on having fashioned his memories into a most fascinating book.

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* It may be well here to correct a mistake in last month's Literary Notices. The name of the writer of *Rupert, by the Grace of God* is not Dora Greenwell but Dora Greenwell McChesney.

Richard Carvel. By Winston Churchill.

STORIES of the days of the outbreak of the American War of Independence are not uncommon, but it is unusual to find one equal in ability to *Richard Carvel.* Mr. Churchill has not hesitated to attempt to picture the colonial life of Maryland and the brilliant circle of London society when Fox led the fashion, and the story is proof that its author understands his art. Few novels have recently appeared where the action runs over such a wide field and introduces so many historical personages. Maryland, with its old world colonial gallantry, the 'tween decks of a rascally slaver, the brilliant circle at 'White's', the decks of Paul Jones' *Bon Homme Richard,* are all the scenes of the daring or gaiety of Richard Carvel. Washington, Horace Walpole, the notorious Lord March, Charles James Fox, John Paul Jones, and a host of others, are in Mr. Churchill's corps of *dramatis personæ,* and their presence gives an air of verisimilitude to the story of Richard Carvel's long and faithful pilgrimage of love. The critical will not be able to avoid comparing Mr. Churchill's book with Thackeray's *Virginians,* and no doubt *Richard Carvel* as a historical picture and a piece of literary composition will suffer by the comparison. But as a clever and vigorous story of varied adventure and constant devotion, it is an admirable production, a thoroughly healthy one, and one that deserves wide popularity.

NOTES AND EXTRACTS.

WE have before us the Twenty-fifth Annual Report of the Minister of State for Education, for the Thirtieth Year of Meiji (1897). It is the latest education report issued by the Government of the Emperor of Japan, and its title shows how modern is the system of education established in that country. The era Meiji, or 'Enlightened Peace', began with the revolution of 1868, when the Emperor was brought out of seclusion and assumed the direct guidance of the affairs of his kingdom, and when Japan entered upon the path of progress along which she has advanced with a rapidity that has amazed the world. The Report lets us see how marvellously comprehensive and complete the Japanese system of education is; indeed, to us it seems to be too much so, when we reflect that it is only a generation ago since the country ceased to be the 'hermit' state of the world, living its own self-contained life, regardless of the tide of civilisation which was advancing upon its shores. But when Japan was awakened out of the age-long cataleptic trance into which she had fallen, the people threw themselves with

feverish energy into the work of modernisation, and they will not rest till they place their country amongst the enlightened and civilised nations of the world. It is the most interesting experiment in political science of modern times,—an Oriental people passing at one leap from the Dark Ages to claim a place alongside the nations who through centuries of training and experience have evolved what we designate modern civilisation. The Government, supported though it is by a people with whom the feeling of patriotism has all the force of a religious conviction, has undertaken more than as yet it has had time to get properly in hand; and at present the danger to which Japan is exposed is that the inflation of patriotic sentiment due to the issue of the war with China will lead to an expenditure on the Army and Navy and on fortifications which will leave too little for the internal development of the country and for the consolidation of such undertakings as the education of the people. We cannot escape the reflection that had Japan attempted less even in the matter of education she would in the long run accomplish more.

Meantime, however, the Report before us contains a record of good, if too varied and extensive, work. The chief measures inaugurated during the year 1897 include the establishment of a new Imperial University at Kyoto. Formerly there was but one University, that at Tokyo, but the pressure for admission has so increased that it has been found necessary to provide greater facilities for higher education, and we understand that since the publication of this Report Government has been considering the foundation of yet a third University. We note also amongst the measures of the year the establishment of a new foreign languages school in connection with the Higher Commercial School, the remodelling and enlargement of the Tokyo Library under the name of the Imperial Library, the institution of local school inspectors, the extension of Normal School Training, and the establishment of regulations for the appointment of teachers in city, town, and village elementary schools, with supplementary provisions relating to salaries. Measures previously put in operation were, according to the Report, followed up during the year, "in the expectation of seeing them more fully realised." Expectation in this direction was not disappointed, for to judge by the figures supplied by the Report, education is becoming more popular every year. Thus the number of public schools was, in 1897, 26,754, and of private schools 1,677, showing an increase of 133 in the former and a decrease of 85 in the latter, as compared with the previous year. Then the number of teachers increased by 3,713, of pupils by 136,226, and of graduates by 42,262. (We presume that the term 'graduate' is applied as in America to a pupil who completes the course of instruction in a school.) The total number of teachers was 86,942, of pupils 4,157,878, and of graduates 571,650. The expenditure on the

public schools showed an increase over the previous financial year of *yen* 3,142,857 (the *yen* is approximately equivalent to two shillings), while the total expenditure amounted to *yen* 18,669,049. A very large proportion of the whole number of educational institutions consisted of Elementary Schools, there being 26,858 of these, with 79,274 teachers and 3,993,898 pupils. The total number of children of school age was 7,730,441, of whom 7,175,786 were "those whose obligation to attend had already commenced." The figures are worked out to show that the percentage of children receiving the prescribed course of instruction was 66·65 of "those under obligation to attend," the percentage of boys being 80·67 and of girls 50·86. Next to the Elementary Schools stand the Ordinary Middle Schools, of which there were in the year under review 157, with 2,180 teachers and 52,442 pupils. It is required that there should be one Middle School in each *Fu* and *Ken* (that is in each imperial city and prefecture, of which there are together 50), but it is plain that local authorities have largely availed themselves of the discretion granted to them of opening more than one within the limits of their jurisdiction, and it is anticipated that there will be a further extension of Middle Schools. The course of instruction in this class of school extends over a period of five years. Above this class stand the Higher Schools, of which there are six, with 337 instructors and 4,436 pupils. The course of study extends over three or four years and is designed to give instruction in special branches of study and to impart such education as is necessary to prepare pupils for the Imperial Universities. This, as it seems to us, is the weak part of the system of education established in Japan. Special courses are entered upon at too early a stage. These Higher Schools have courses of law, medicine, and engineering, and of the pupils attending them 42 took up law, 163 engineering, and 1,556 medicine, leaving 2,675 who were taking the courses preparatory to the Universities. The Imperial University of Kyoto was only established in the year under review, and calls for no comment. It has been established, as we have already remarked, to relieve the pressure for admission to the University of Tokyo. This latter institution consists of a University Hall and Colleges of Law, Medicine, Engineering, Literature, Science, and Agriculture, each with a formidable array of courses. The number of students in the Colleges was 1,753 and of 'pupils' 281, giving a total of 2,034. Of these we observe that no fewer than 760 were studying law, while 430 had taken up engineering, 340 literature, and 304 medicine. The distinction between 'pupils' and 'students' in the University is not explained in the Report.

A most important feature of any system of education is the provision made for the training of teachers, and we find that in Japan much attention has been paid to this matter. Each *Fu* and *Ken* possesses one

Ordinary Normal School furnished with an Elementary School for training pupils in the methods of instruction. The course of study extends over four years in the case of males and three years in the case of females. The total number of pupils in these schools was in 1897, 6,820. Besides these Ordinary there are two Higher Normal Schools, one for males, the other for females. These institutions are designed to prepare pupils as directors of, and instructors in, Ordinary Normal Schools and Ordinary Middle Schools, and at the same time "to enable them to prosecute investigations into the methods of general education." The number of pupils in the Higher Normal School for males was 402, in that for females 171.

In addition to the above there are Kindergartens for the training of children under school age, Apprentices' Schools, in which pupils are prepared as workmen, Technical Schools, with courses in dyeing, weaving, furnace work, applied chemistry, mechanics, and electrical engineering, an Agricultural School, a Higher Commercial School, a Fine Arts School, an Academy of Music, and Schools for the Blind and Dumb.

We have here then a most comprehensive programme for the carrying out of which Japan deserves all the sympathy and encouragement which the enlightened nations of the world can give her; but to our mind it would have been a wiser policy if she had concentrated her energies upon a less ambitious programme for a time and had been content to make a large use for a longer time of foreign help in the development of her educational system. At present Japanese education is superficial to a degree that is scarcely known in India, certainly not known in South India, and there is one defect in it which may have the most serious consequences ultimately for the State. The policy of the Government is such that it will drive out of the field all private enterprise, and with private effort all religious instruction will be eliminated from education in Japan. The Government is not professedly or directly hostile to religious instruction, but in the institutions under its own management religious instruction forms no part of the course, and now, owing to the privileges in connection with conscription which are conceded to students in the Government institutions, all the higher education is bound to become non-religious. Time will bring to light the moral loss which such a system will inevitably inflict upon the nation, but, besides, the policy does not seem to us to be wise from the economic point of view. The Government might encourage the expenditure of the funds of Buddhist and Shinto temples and monasteries on education by a more liberal policy, and might also encourage the introduction into the country of foreign capital by the missionary bodies for the same beneficent end, thus setting free part of the revenue of the country for other objects. With the present policy such an institution as the Dōshisha at Kyoto, which might have been the great Christian Uni-

versity of Japan, and which represents no inconsiderable amount of capital, is in danger of becoming derelict. This would mean a loss not only to the missionary body interested in its maintenance but an economic loss to Japan. We trust that wiser counsels may yet prevail with the Emperor's Government,--counsels the adoption of which may be a pecuniary gain to the State, and, what is of far more moment, may lead to a higher tone and sentiment being infused into the spirit of the nation.

ONE of the ways in which the party of reform in this country seek to ameliorate the condition of women is by directing the attention of the people to the fact that in the earlier and better days of Hinduism women were free from many of the disabilities under which they labour now. The same way of dealing with the same problem is evidently being employed by the more advanced Muhammadans in Egypt. Under the title of 'The Emancipation of Egyptian Women' Kassem Amin Bey, Councillor of the Court of Appeal, Cairo, has recently published a work in Arabic in which he urges on his fellow-countrymen the necessity of modifying their laws and customs concerning women; and in a short article contributed to the October number of the *Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review* he gives an outline of the ideas developed in his book.

Observation and history, says Kassem Amin Bey, indicate a correlation between the position of woman within a society and the degree of civilisation to which the society has attained. Among the Arabs before the time of the Prophet a father had the power of life and death over his daughters, and there was no restriction upon the number of wives a man could possess. Islám considerably improved the position of women by giving them liberty and independence, and by conferring on them the same legal rights as were possessed by men. The inferior status of Musalman women must not, therefore, be attributed to the Qurán. On the contrary, says Kassem Amin Bey, the good effects which might have been expected from the Muhammadan law have been destroyed through the influence of savage customs which existed among the people who accepted Islám and which owed their influence largely to the despotic forms of government that prevailed among the Musalman peoples. Hence it is that among Muhammadans polygamy is common, that the right of repudiation is accorded to husbands but never to wives, and that women are veiled, secluded, and subjected to many other restrictions that proclaim their inferiority to men. In Egypt, Kassem Amin Bey says, matters have somewhat improved of recent years, and some women are allowed to walk out, to frequent the market places, and to accompany their husbands when away from home. Educated men do not consider their wives unworthy of their confidence and their friendship. All this is due, however, to the good sense of individual men

and to reforms introduced by the Government; and no general improvement in the condition of women can be looked for until they are educated, and the barriers which custom has set up to their free intercourse with men are broken down. These two reforms are not independent of each other, for the principal obstacle to the education of women is the state of seclusion in which they are condemned to live. A few girls, says Kassem Amin Bey, receive a fairly liberal education, but being shut up at the age of thirteen or fourteen they forget all that they learn at school and do not learn anything else.

Looking at the question from the religious point of view, Kassem Amin Bey says that Islám has never enjoined the veil nor decreed the separation of men and women. The only provisions in the Qurán relating to the separation of men and women refer to the wives of the Prophet. That this is so is shown, Kassem Amin Bey says, by the fact that in the first few centuries of Islám women of all classes mixed in the society of men, and that several of them distinguished themselves in various departments of human activity. The humiliating restraints that are placed upon the liberty of Muhammadan women are said to be essential to the preservation of their morality, but Kassem Amin Bey says that the effect of these restraints is to a large extent the very opposite of what it is meant to be. He calls upon his countrymen to look at Europe and profit by her experience: and urges them in conclusion to educate their women; to give them liberty; to give to marriage its proper dignity by basing it upon the reciprocal inclination of both parties, which at present is impossible; to make regulations in regard to the husband's right of repudiation and to grant the same right to the wife; and to prohibit polygamy by law. These reforms, he says, not only contain nothing contrary to the religion of Islám, they actually emanate from it.

It is extremely interesting to see how western civilisation is showing intelligent Muhammadans how fatal their social system is to all real progress; and all honour is due to those who, whether in Egypt or in India, are protesting against it. But Kassem Amin Bey and others of the reform party are beginning at the wrong end. The whole social system of Islám, as it at present exists, is indissolubly united to the Shariat, or Sacred Law, and until that is changed, there can be no real social reform. Kassem Amin Bey refers to certain actions and customs of the Prophet as having only an individual and local bearing, and to the prohibition of social intercourse as being merely based on a Hadis, or saying of the Prophet handed down by tradition; but he knows perfectly well that the actions and the sayings of the Prophet form a divine rule of faith and practice—a rule called the Sunnat, which no Muslim dare disobey or slight. Again, if something in Islám has not caused and maintained the present degradation of Islám, how is it that in so many

centuries and amongst peoples the most diverse the same evil exists? The fact is that the ideal placed before Musalmans in the matter by the Qurán is low. A reference to passages in the Second Sura on the law of divorce and the previous statement of the relation of the woman to the man will show that the Qurán itself has much more to do with the evil than Kassem Amin Bey would lead us to suppose.

We have before us the Administration Report of the Meteorological Department of the Government of India for 1898-99, and a memoir by Mr. Eliot on the air movement at Simla and in the Western Himalayas. The Report states that the instruments for use in the seismological observatories which it had been decided to establish at Alipore, Colaba, and Madras were received during the year, and that the instrument for the Alipore observatory was placed in position and brought into use from the 1st of December. It was found impossible to carry on the work of cloud observation at Calcutta, which had been begun in 1897, but regular observations were taken at Allahabad, and the results are to be published in a memoir. In connection with the question of the establishment of a meteorological observatory at Ootacamund with a subsidiary observatory on the top of Dodabetta, Mr. Eliot makes the mistake of calling Dodabetta the highest peak of Southern India. The Report shows that the forecast of the probable character of the rainfall during the south-west monsoon of 1898 was in very fair accordance with fact, but that the forecast for the period from December 1898 to February 1899 was much less successful. A larger amount of inspection was done during the year under review than in the previous year; and while it was found that the majority of the observers were doing their work carefully, some of the observatories were discovered to be in a very unsatisfactory condition. Owing to the fact that the work at many of the second class observatories has been very unsatisfactorily performed, it has been decided to reduce the number of such observatories from 61 to 38. Those which are to be retained will be provided with barographs and thermographs for the continuous registration of the pressure and the temperature.

The memoir on the air movement at Simla and in the Western Himalayas is the first part of a discussion of the anemographic observations recorded at Simla during the period from September 1893 to August 1896 and at Darjeeling during the period from April 1885 to December 1896, and an investigation into the general features of the air movement in the Himalayan area. We cannot enter into details regarding the facts dealt with in the memoir or the inferences which Mr. Eliot draws from them, but we may state a few of the more important results of the investigation. For one thing it has been established that the air movement over the Himalayan area is unique and largely

independent of the air movement in the adjacent plains of Northern India, and that it is due not to the general pressure relations obtaining in the plains of Northern and Central India but to special conditions and relations between the hills and the plains. Secondly, the most important feature of this movement is that there is throughout the year an alternating movement between the hills and the plains, the intensity of which is roughly proportional to the diurnal range of temperature in the Punjab plains. This alternating movement is independent of the change of seasons and of the air movement in the plains of Northern India, and is due to the changes of pressure vertically produced by the unequal expansion and contraction of the lower and middle strata of the atmosphere over the plains of Upper India and the Western Himalayan mountain zone. It is the preponderating feature of the air movement in the months of October, November, December, March, and April, while in the other months of the year it is always a component of the mean air movement. In November it occurs free from disturbing effects, in January and February it is combined with the air movement due to frequent extensive feeble cyclonic storms crossing Northern India, while from May to September it is combined with movements of indraught to low pressure areas in Upper India and to occasional cyclonic storms, which, however, do not occur with sufficient frequency to affect the mean air movement to any considerable extent.

The alternating movement thus described is the chief factor in determining the temperature conditions of Simla, and it also gives rise to peculiar features in the humidity conditions prevailing there. It is obviously a very important feature of the air movement in Northern India, and, as Mr. Eliot says, will have to be taken into consideration in any discussion and explanation of the chief features of the diurnal oscillation of pressure in the plains and hills.

COLLEGE NOTES.

We are informed by the Secretary of the College Day Committee that the College Day will this year be celebrated in the College premises on Friday, the 29th instant. The programme will commence as usual with coffee and refreshments at 7 A.M., after which a conference of members will be held. At 5 P.M. a portrait of Dr. Cooper will be unveiled, and at 5-30 a general meeting will be held in the Anderson Hall. A fee of four annas will be received from such of the old students of the College as have paid not less than Rs. 5 towards the College Day Fund, and a fee of twelve annas from others, for taking part in the celebration.

Dinner will be served at 11 A.M. to all who make application for it and pay an additional fee of four annas.

The College Day Committee will be glad to receive subscriptions for the purpose of defraying the cost of the portrait of Dr. Cooper and founding a prize as a memorial of him.

SCIENTIFIC AND LITERARY JOTTINGS.

DETAILS have now been published regarding the process by which Professor Dewar succeeded in obtaining solid hydrogen. About a year ago, when he found that he could make liquid hydrogen in quantity, he made the attempt to reduce it to the solid state. He did this by enclosing some of the liquid hydrogen in a vacuum tube, and surrounding it with a larger vessel containing more of the liquid hydrogen. This he evaporated under about 10 mm. pressure, but no solidification was obtained. In some subsequent experiments there happened to be a slight leak of air, and as the pressure was reduced the hydrogen suddenly solidified into a white froth-like mass like frozen foam. Professor Dewar thought at first that this must be a sponge of solid air containing the liquid hydrogen, like what is obtained with ordinary air, which gives a magma of solid nitrogen and liquid oxygen. When it evaporated, however, there was so little solid air left behind that it was evident that the white solid froth must have been solid hydrogen.

THE result of this experiment suggested to Professor Dewar that the failure of his first attempts to obtain solid hydrogen must have been due to the supercooling of the liquid, which was prevented in this case by the traces of solid air which were present. To settle the question, he took a flask with a manometer at the side of it and sealed to its mouth a long bent glass tube. This tube he led into a vacuum vessel containing liquid hydrogen and arranged for exhaustion. The pressure was gradually reduced, and when it was about 30 mm. the liquid hydrogen suddenly passed into a solid white foam-like mass, almost filling the whole space. The pressure was reduced still further and the solid became less opaque and appeared like transparent ice with a frothy surface. The temperature was taken by means of a constant volume hydrogen thermometer, the electric resistance thermometer having been found unsatisfactory. The result obtained for the melting point of hydrogen was about 16° or 17° above the absolute zero. Professor Dewar, in concluding his account of his experiments, remarks that they remove the last doubt as to the possibility of solid hydrogen having a

metallic character, so that for the future hydrogen must be classed among the non-metallic elements.

THE proposal to lower the musical pitch, which has for many years been discussed in England, seems to be now in a fair way to being generally adopted. Madame Patti took the lead some time ago in introducing this reform, which is so desirable in the interests of vocalists, by getting the Covent Garden Opera to adopt the French pitch. Since then Mr. Newman of the Queen's Hall and Mr. Henschel on founding the Scottish Orchestra adopted that pitch, and the Philharmonic Society at last assured the success of the movement by announcing that the standard tuning fork for their concerts should be A=439 at 68° F. We now learn that the London pianoforte makers have agreed to change from A=455 to the new Philharmonic standard. The Paris diapason normal is usually given as A=435. This number of vibrations represents the pitch for open-air music such as military bands usually give, while the other is really the same standard raised to the average performing temperature of orchestras.

LORD KELVIN has written to *Nature* from Aix-les-Bains stating that he had there an opportunity of seeing the earliest light of dawn through very clear air. He has been for years waiting for such an opportunity in order to find whether the earliest instantaneous light is perceptibly blue. Looking out one morning at half-past five, he saw rosy tints appear on each side of the place of strongest twilight, and, a little later, beams of sunlight and shadows of distant mountains converged clearly to a point deep under the very summit of Mont Blanc. "In the course of five or ten minutes," he says, "I was able to watch the point of convergence travelling obliquely upwards till in an instant I saw a blue light against the sky on the southern profile of Mont Blanc; which, in less than the one-twentieth of a second became dazzlingly white, like a brilliant electric arc-light." He adds that about six years ago he saw for the first time the 'rayon vert' of Jules Verne, which is the corresponding phenomenon at sunset.

THE success of the *Times* in its bookselling enterprise has led other newspapers to follow its example. The most important of these new ventures is that of the *Standard*, which is offering for six and a half guineas twenty volumes "comprising the great literature of all times." This new *Library of Famous Literature* is to be edited by Dr. Richard Garnett, C.B., and seems from the account given of it in the *Academy* to be much more than a mere miscellaneous collection of 'elegant extracts'. The men who are to be associated with Dr. Garnett in the

production of the work are eminent literary men, and in addition to them there is a strong body of interpreters and critics who are to provide introductory studies or essays on such periods and phases of literature as seem to require elucidation. For example, Mr. Henry James is to sketch *The Rise of the Novel*, M. Emile Zola will contribute an essay on *Naturalism and Romanticism*, Mr. Bret Harte will write on *The Rise of the Short Story*, Dr. Dowden on *The Elizabethan Era and its Influence on English Literature*, and Mr. Andrew Lang on *The Progress of Literature in the Nineteenth Century*. One important point is that under each period the reader will find not only writings which belong to it in point of time, but also any writings which throw light on the period, though they may have been written centuries later. The *Academy* ends its account of the work with the remark that it "makes good its claim to be a compact and representative display of the literature of the world."

Mr. Grant Allen, whose death took place last month, was one of the most versatile of English literary men. He was long known as a popular writer on subjects connected with natural history, and especially with evolution. Later he became a successful writer of novels and short stories, although, it is said, he despised and disliked fiction. More recently he occupied himself with the production of guide books which are highly spoken of. He was known also as a writer on artistic and anthropological subjects. He died at the age of fifty-one.

Messrs. Blackie and Son, Ld., have requested us to call attention to a letter that has been sent to the leading literary journals by Mr. G. A. Henty. Mr. Henty is best known as a writer of books for boys, and by an arrangement with Messrs. Blackie and Son he has given that firm the monopoly of his boys' books. He has, however, written some novels which have been published by other firms. Messrs. Blackie and Mr. Henty now complain that these other firms are reissuing these novels, in one case altering the title, in such a form as to lead the public to believe that they are new boys' books from the pen of Mr. Henty. These firms apparently have legal right on their side, but their action seems fair neither to Mr. Henty nor to Messrs. Blackie nor yet to the book-buying public, which may be led to buy novels while fancying that they are buying books for boys. Messrs. Blackie and Mr. Henty have therefore done well to call to attention to the fact that the only new boys' books issued this season by Mr. G. A. Henty are *Won by the Sword*, *A Roving Commission*, and *No Surrender*, and that in buying the volumes *Rujub Juggler*, *Colonel Thorndyke's Secret*, and *Cuthbert Harrington*, purchasers are not buying new books, still less books for boys.

The *Times* characterises R. L. Stevenson's *Letters to his Family and Friends*, which has just been published, as a book of extraordinary fascination. Irresistible in their raciness, their variety, and their animation, the letters are said to produce in the reader that "enhanced sense of life" which it is supposed to be the function of the highest art to call into being. And this in spite of the fact that the whole situation is dominated by the central fact of Stevenson's ill-health, and the scarcely less important fact that until near the end of his life he had to struggle hard to maintain himself. His father, though not rich, was always willing to help him, but Stevenson had an exaggerated sense of the value of independence and preferred to feel the pinch of poverty rather than be indebted to any one. And even he had to wait a considerable time before obtaining the ear of the reading public. After the publication of the *Inland Voyage* and *Travels with a Donkey* his earnings for a year only just exceeded £100, and he was more than delighted when a firm of publishers bought *Treasure Island* for £100.

A feature of Stevenson's letters is the number of references they contain to his views on the literary art and his opinions of other writers. His judgment upon his brothers in letters, the *Times* reviewer says, are all genial, totally untouched with literary jealousy, and all wonderfully sound and true.

Messrs. G. A. Natesan and Co. announce the appearance next month of a new magazine to be called *The Indian Review.* It is to be published monthly and is to contain not less than 40 pages of matter. It is to contain original articles and notes on a large variety of topics.

Many new books dealing with the Transvaal are one of the results of the war. The most notable that has yet appeared is one by Mr. Fitzpatrick entitled *The Transvaal from Within.* Mr. Fitzpatrick was the secretary of the Johannesburg Reform Committee at the time of the Jameson Raid, and he has kept a private record of public affairs in the Transvaal since that time. Lord Rosebery in a speech which he recently delivered at Bath, says of Mr. Fitzpatrick's work: "It is a book which seems to me to bear on every page and in every sentence the mark of truth, and which gives you wholesale and in detail an extraordinary, and I think I may say an appalling, record of the way in which the Government of the Transvaal was carried on."

Dr. Fitchett, author of *Deeds that Won the Empire*, is at work on a much larger book, *How England Saved Europe.* It is the story of the great war of 1793—1815, and the first of the four volumes of which it is to consist is to appear shortly.

THE *Athenæum* announces the appearance of a translation into Sanskrit of Mr. Herbert Spencer's Work on *Education*, by Mr. H. Subba Rau, a retired deputy-collector. Mr. Subba Rau has chosen Sanskrit as he intends his translation primarily for the use of pandits.

THE Cambridge University Press announces the appearance of a facsimile of the unique manuscript of Milton's minor poems in Trinity Library. The manuscript also contains a first sketch of *Paradise Lost*, differing widely from the form it finally took. It contains, for instance, the announcement that Moses speaks the prologue.

SIR M. E. GRANT DUFF is going to publish a fourth series of *Notes from a Diary*. It is to cover the years 1886, 1887, and 1888.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

THE *Contemporary Review* for November does not contain much that is fresh or interesting. There are no fewer than three articles on South African matters. The first is by Sir Charles Warren, who gives a sketch of the history of colonization in South Africa from its beginning to the present time, and traces all the difficulties that have arisen to the want of a settled policy on the part of the British Government in dealing with South African affairs. Kunwana, a native, expressed the views which bitter experience has impressed on all the loyal subjects in South Africa when he said on May 26, 1884: "I have the highest opinion of the justice and fairness of the Queen's Government, but it always leaves the country when it is most needed." It was this feeling which led the loyals of all races at last to join their opponents in the cry of "Africa for the Africanders." It is not too much to say that the Empire is indebted to John Mackenzie the Kuruman missionary for stemming single-handed the tide of the 'giving-up' policy. Summing up, Sir Charles Warren says that there have been many blunders made, but with right intentions; by wonderful good fortune they have all turned into an advantage; and, at the present moment, the Dutch Africander who can study history must be aware that when the Government has erred it has been in his favour.

Mr. Percy A. Molteno also deals with the cause of the war in South Africa, but takes an opposite view to that taken by Sir Charles Warren. The changes in policy have been due, he says, to the fact that those sent out to Africa by the British Government have invariably been converted by a knowledge of the country and of the people and have reversed the policy with which they started, and all the trouble has arisen from the refusal of the British Government to follow the policy which experience recommended. Those who have lived long in the country are well aware that there was not the remotest danger to British predominance and prestige in South Africa. The counsels of force have come from men whose experience of the country is too recent to be of value. Lord Rosmead (Sir Herules Robinson) was always opposed to the use of force and declared it would only create an Ireland in South Africa. The changes

desired would have come about naturally from economic causes, and it should be our object to minimise and bring to a conclusion with as little delay as possible a war which should not have been begun.

'An Old Campaigner' discusses the position from a military point of view.

The Lambeth 'Opinion' and its consequences is the text of an article by Canon Knox Little. That opinion, he thinks, cannot be sustained to the minds of reasonable men. Obedience may be a vice: resistance to ecclesiastical authority wrongly exercised may be a positive duty.

M. L. Trarieux puts in a protest against the unlimited denunciation of the French nation by foreigners in connection with the Dreyfus case. It is overlooked, he says, that the people were for the most part deceived and misled, and no credit is given to France for men like Zola and Picquart, who have been the true interpreters of that national spirit which has always shown itself alive to questions of justice and generosity. Let foreign nations be reassured and retract their too severe judgment. France is gathering up her forces to achieve the final step which will extricate her from a fatal error.

The scope and intention of Lord Russell's Bill to check commercial corruption are explained by the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward Fry, who himself has had a share in the production of the Bill. Mr. Thomas Hodgkin gives an account of the Congress held this year at Cividale to celebrate the eleventh centenary of Paulus Diaconus the Lombard historian; Professor Dicey describes how English Law is taught at the University of Harvard; and Lieutenant-Col. Balfour sends a letter to the Editor on the employment of volunteers abroad.

Mr. Anderson replies to the criticism on his book *The Silence of God*, which appeared in the September issue. He says it is not the statement of an opinion, but the assertion of a fact, that the history of Christendom does not record "a single public event to compel belief that there is a God." Were it otherwise atheism would be impossible. The existence of atheism is a fact which undermines all his critic's arguments. Mr. Anderson seems incapable of grasping his critic's argument. There never has been at any time a public event to *compel* belief that there is a God. The moral government of the world is full of mystery; but it has always been full of mystery. It is possible to refuse any interpretation of its action in our day; but it was possible to do so in the days of the prophets as well. There were atheists then as there are now. Faith has always been, as it always will be while the world lasts, the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.

Many attempts have been made to determine the character of the primeval language, but the methods usually pursued have been very faulty. Mr. C. Johnston follows a much more rational method. The history of the individual is in miniature the history of the race, and the primeval language is the language of the child. The original language was purely vowel and musical. The Polynesian language is still rich in pure vowel words. The next step in the development of language was the introduction of semi-vowels. Then came the three contacts followed by the nasals. A whole family of languages stopped at this point. The Maori Alphabet is a, e, i, o, u; k, ng; t, n; p, m; h, r, w. Next came the differentiation of the original contacts into surds and sonants, p and b; t and d. The Dravidian tongues of Southern India are still at this dividing of the ways.

Sir Edmund Verney contributes very amusing and interesting reminiscences of 'Old Crimean Days', when he served as a midshipman on the *Terrible*.

There is an important article on Christian dogma and the Christian life by Professor A. Sabatier, who sums up the result of his study in the following propositions:—

(1) Our piety is disquieted and troubled by the antagonism obscurely felt between the new truths and ancient beliefs. Christian Science can bring peace and dissipate our disquiet.

(2) As regards Holy Scripture, the radical transformation of old dogmatic views as regards inspira-

tion and the canon has the advantage of delivering our piety from the intolerable yoke of the letter, and rendering us more attentive and more strongly attached to *the spirit*. Instead of a code we have a book of life and fire.

(3) So also Christian Science renders traditional *dogmas* really useful by renewing their interpretation.

(4) Called ceaselessly in this way to distinguish everywhere between changing forms and secure foundations, between that which is essential and that which is but accessory, our piety necessarily gains in spirituality and morality; it is obliged to fall back on its principles, on the personal experience of its truth, on the actual and interior witness of the Holy Spirit, the source of all certainty and peace to the Christian's soul.

(5) Once having arrived at the conviction of the relative value of dogmatic forms as regards Christianity, which is "spirit and life," Christians of different denominations will no longer feel separated by insurmountable barriers. Their brotherly communion will become less restrained and sweeter, the feeling of their oneness deeper, the reality of the great family of God on earth more real than ever.

(6) With regard to the formularies of the past our attitude cannot be either blind reaction or violent rupture. The Christianity of our day is not capable of effectually formulating and sanctioning new dogmas. What is needed is to make a translation of ancient ideas into new ones, and so show the continuity of living Christian thought amidst the accidents, the contradictions, and the revolutions of history. Like all former crises, that which Christianity is traversing to-day is not a crisis of death but of growth.

THE Editor of the *Nineteenth Century* has evidently found it difficult to procure sufficient material for the month just finished. The articles have considerable variety, but little interest, and a large proportion of them have little connection with present-day affairs. The first and last places are naturally enough given to the Transvaal War. Mr. Edward Dicey deals with the question of the future of South Africa, and though it is well to take time by the forelock, it is also well not to count the chickens before they are hatched. It is perfectly true that there is but one opinion as to the ultimate issue of the war, but it is folly to talk as if that issue were an absolute certainty. Infinite complications with other Powers are ever a possibility, and who can say with any feeling of assurance that such are even yet beyond the region of probability? Mr. Dicey's contention is expressed as follows:—"We have got to make it clear not only to the Boers and the Afrikander Bond, but to the world at large, that henceforth South Africa is to be part and parcel of the British Empire, a self-governing province administered on terms of absolute equality for all white inhabitants of the country, but administered under the absolute and undisputed supremacy of Great Britain." That this end may be in every sense of the word secured the war must be carried on with determination until the Boers acknowledge British supremacy. The danger is that in deference to Boer susceptibilities the war may be cut short and an unsatisfactory peace attained. We know now, if we did not know before, that the Boers had the belief that they could defeat the British Empire, and recover their lost supremacy. This widespread delusion must be utterly crushed before anything like a satisfactory peace can be reached. Mr. Dicey argues that some sort of federal government for South Africa must be established. The relations between the Dutch element and the British have made this impossible hitherto, but the time is coming when an exceptional opportunity will be offered for the carrying out of some scheme of this nature. The success of the scheme will no doubt depend upon the extent to which the Boers will cooperate, but the probabilities are that after a time the feelings of animosity will die down under the new conditions. Mr. Dicey is unquestionably optimistic, and however

much one might wish to believe his prognostications, it is difficult not to feel that the seeds of the present war may produce for generations to come a harvest of trouble and perplexity which will be the burden of many a future statesman.

Sir Wemyss Reid contributes a diary for the month of October which he entitles 'The Newspapers'. The underlying idea is a criticism of the newspapers as the conveyancers of news, particularly with regard to the war. The newspapers at the beginning of the month made it impossible to arrive at the truth in the quarrel between the British and the Boers. The more one read the rival newspapers the more difficult did it become to know where the truth was to be found. Hardly any two newspapers were agreed as to the real *casus belli.*

The diary gives an excellent sketch of the attitude of the English mind during the month of October. We quote here a few sentences culled from the entry on the eleventh. "Alas! uncertainty is at an end, and the sword is to cut the knot after all. On this historic date—a date which will have a place of its own in the story of the British Empire—it may not be amiss to place on record, whilst they are still fresh in the mind, the impressions one has gathered of the reception of the news of the Boer ultimatum. . . . To the last men have hoped against hope that, somehow or other, peace would be maintained. The first impression which was produced by the disastrous announcement which rendered war inevitable seemed to be one of genuine sorrow. I spoke to many men last night, including not a few who have been the stout upholders of Mr. Chamberlain's policy, but from no one did I hear a word of rejoicing at the disappearance of the hopes of peace. Whatever the empty-headed mob in the streets may think or say, there were no signs of Jingo rejoicing among responsible persons last night. The pity of the thing seemed to be that aspect of it which affected most minds, the pity of the fact that the most powerful Empire in the world was now to draw the sword against a little State whose population would hardly fill one of our second class provincial towns, and that in this war many brave men of both races must meet an untimely death."

A fresh narrative of the battle of Trafalgar is contributed in the form of a letter written by Captain Cumby of the *Bellerophon* to his son. The letter gives an account of the battle in considerable detail and is important from the fact that it has never before been published. It is accompanied by a map showing the position of the ships. This also was drawn by Captain Cumby. Both documents have been furnished by a granddaughter of the captain.

Mr. H. W. Massingham contributes a criticism of Lord Rosebery. He holds that Lord Rosebery has broken with the Liberal party. "What does he represent? The *Daily Mail*? I know of no other Rosebery party." Possibly he may yet lead a party of the 'Centre' which vaguely threatens to overthrow the old constitutional balance between Whigs and Tories. Here he might do some service, and probably he will do so "rather than fret himself with more sojourning in the wilderness with the Liberal party."

'The Intellectual Future of Catholicism' is the title of an article by Mr. W. H. Mallock, which tells us much more about what Protestantism is not than what Catholicism is. The object of the article is to show that in the struggle with scientific knowledge, it is the Christianity that is embodied in the Church of Rome and not in any form of Protestantism, that will survive. Mr. Mallock holds that the great principles which are the foundation of Reformed Christianity have through the growth of criticism been completely destroyed, *viz.*, the belief that the Bible contains in itself a clear indication of what Christian doctrine is, and secondly, the belief that if any further guide is required we shall find it in the beliefs and practices of Christ's earliest followers. Science, he considers, has destroyed the authority of the Bible, it has destroyed also the authority of primitive Christian doctrine. Protestantism is therefore left with-

out any final authority, whereas the Church of Rome finds its authority in itself. From time to time under very special conditions, and as the occasion happens to demand, it infallibly enunciates the truth through its elaborately organised Councils. The argument is amusing. Mr. Mallock forgets that the very scientific knowledge which is destroying the authority of the Bible is destroying belief in the infallibility of a Church Council. To say that a Council is infallible simply because the Church of Rome postulates it so is an argument which might be used against Mr. Mallock; for with equal truth it might be asserted that the Bible is an infallible authority because particular bodies among Protestants hold it to be such. It is possible to shut our eyes to historical criticism and adhere to the infallible authority of the Bible, just as it is possible to shut our eyes to the assertions of common sense and experience and adhere to the infallible authority of Church Councils. But the ignoring of facts will in neither case prove of much avail in the future.

Miss A. Goodrich Freer gives an account of the success or lack of success that has so far attended the efforts made in recent years to train women as gardeners. Out of a hundred women who began horticultural studies only sixteen are now at work as qualified gardeners. The conclusion is that an acceptable system of education has still to be evolved. Miss Freer holds that gardening as a profession is excellently adapted to women, and further that the demand is in excess of the supply. What is needed is a better system which would offer more inducement to women to undertake to be trained, and to continue in the profession when trained.

Professor Max Müller in 'Literature before Letters' argues that literature was handed down traditionally long before it was committed to writing, and in proof appeals mainly to the fact that Sanskrit literature was originally not a written but a mnemonic literature, and that to this day Sanskrit scholars can repeat thousands of lines without the aid of the eye.

One eastern subject is dealt with in 'A Devil-Dance in Ceylon', by Mrs. Corner-Ohlmüs, a slight brief narrative of an ordinary Eastern experience.

THE *Fortnightly*, like all the other magazines, has much to say about South Africa. Thirty-six pages of the November number are devoted to the present situation and its probable consequences. One article dwells upon the pernicious influence of the Afrikander Bond. Founded about twenty years ago, this Bond was at first simply a farmers' alliance. But in its development the peaceful side more and more gave place to an alliance of those who looked forward to the possession of South Africa by the Dutch. The anonymous writer of this article states that the disturbing influence of this Bond was at work long before the discovery of gold, or the appearance of Mr. Rhodes on the scene of South African politics. If the statement is true that the Bond has been for years fostering racial hatred, and filling the Dutch with illusory hopes of possession, it is no wonder that the present situation has arisen. For the last two or three years ammunition has been imported through Delagoa Bay, and tons of it were being piled up near Kimberley while the Bloemfontein Conference was going on. It is well to remember at the present time the fact that the Boers who are now opposed to us are the descendants of the men who owe their laws, education, and political existence to the British. The task that now lies before us is in reality a legacy from David Livingstone. "The Boers," he said, "resolved to shut up the interior, and I determined to open the country; and we shall see who have been most successful in resolution—they or I." In the settlement which the writer of this article speaks of as necessarily following the present war, the Free State must, he considers, be brought under the direct control of the High Commissioner for South Africa as a distinct territorial district. With regard to the Transvaal the boundaries would need to be so arranged as to make the southern

frontier a line running from Mafeking to Komatie Poort.

Mr. Karl Blind gives some reminiscences of his meetings with Kruger and other Transvaal officials when they were in England in 1884. Of Kruger he says: "He sat there, comfortably smoking his short pipe, with apparent tranquillity of mind: but a close observer could not mistake the dour stubbornness underlying that calm behaviour. In his blue eyes there sparkled a steady gleam of quiet watchfulness."

Mr. W. E. Garrett Fisher writes upon 'The Art of Flying'. Mr. Fisher is quite enthusiastic about this art, although he cannot but admit that those who try to make flight in mid-air a possibility for man are looked upon as those who spend their fortunes and break their necks. Men have wished for the wings of a dove for centuries. A Turk is said to have actually flown for some distance in the time and in the presence of the Emperor Manuel Comnenus, and the account of his flight has marks which point to its not being a mythical story. Captain Le Bris, about the middle of this century, made an artificial albatross by means of which he flew a distance of 200 yards, rising to the height of 300 feet from the ground. Mr. Maxim has now ready a large flying machine which has yet to be tested, and Mr. Langley has an aerodrome which has flown for more than half a mile and has come down safely. At present the problem of flying is being attacked on three lines, by way of the navigable balloon, the flying-machine, and wings. The navigable balloon method does not properly come within the province of flight. The other two methods may be spoken of as the employment of aeroplanes with or without motors independent of the wind. Professor Langley has done much to investigate the phenomena connected with wind, and his investigations fully support a suggestion made by Lord Rayleigh sixteen years ago that the wind is not uniform. "In a high wind," he says, "the air moves in a tumultuous mass, the velocity being at one moment, perhaps, forty miles an hour, then diminishing to an almost instantaneous calm, and then resuming." This explains how even huge birds are able to balance themselves for a considerable time in the teeth of a big gale. If these constant fluctuations of the wind could be taken advantage of flight ought, he believes, to be an easy matter.

Mr. James Stuart, an engineer of the Bengal-Assam Railway, writes on 'Direct Railway Communication between India and China', and sketches a line to run from Calcutta to Shanghai *via* Assam, between the 27th and the 30th degrees of latitude.

'The Need to Believe' is the title of an article by Vernon Lee to which she gives the sub-title 'An Agnostic's Notes on Professor Wm. James'. The book by Professor James to which she refers is *The Will to Believe*, a volume of essays which she characterises as "delightful and intolerable." She says that we moderns have been led to see that "logical proof and ocular demonstration are not much more than negative powers, and that a stronger motive than they is needed to set agoing our lazy and much impeded conceptions." Belief arises primarily because we feel in a certain way, because of the affective side of our nature. In its early stages belief is indistinguishable from expectation, but as expectation gets disappointed belief gets placed on a firmer logical basis. Now this elimination of personal desire is never completed in the process of belief so far as it is concerned with matters religious and philosophical. While the more material forms of belief have dispensed with the emotional element, religious belief has consistently retained it. This, however, in the writer's opinion, does not cast any slight upon religious belief, for it still leaves to religion the power to enrich life by increasing and regulating its complexities. It is not very easy to follow her in this conclusion. For it goes further than it seems. Religion may be regarded as an outlet of æsthetic feelings, but that has not in general been the way it has been looked at. Religious belief has in all ages resulted in action, and often in most vigorous action. The deeds done in its name

have produced effects which have made and marred states. Such results are something very different from the results of a trained æsthetic sentiment. Whether one approves or disapproves of religion, it is surely unsatisfactory to base belief in it on the merely personal element of desire. The desire must be confronted with actuality, and either bear or not bear the strain. Vernon Lee's position finds its difficulty in the problem of evil. Why should we need to believe in a God, and at the same time have to criticise Him for the presence of evil in the world? We rather ought to regard such feelings as purely subjective, and to recognise in evil what is unsuitable to us, although when it is banished from our sphere it may be suitable for other beings. It is not difficult to see where such a position would land us. We should need not to believe in the presence of evil at all, or in the reality of any moral distinctions. Vernon Lee is correct in drawing attention to the *need* for believing, and to its close connection with the emotional side of our nature. She has done well, too, to emphasise the point that we are only too ready to feel compelled to a certain belief because it suits our likings. But the highest satisfaction in belief surely comes from the sense that what we believe is what is in accordance with reality

Mr. Arthur Symons, writing on John Donne, says that Mr. Gosse's recently published Life and Letters of the well-known Dean is "perhaps the most solid and serious contribution which Mr. Gosse has made to English literature," and he considers that it is likely to remain "the final authority on so interesting and difficult a subject." We are glad to hear this praise, for Mr. Gosse's work seemed to us a greater one than his subject demanded. But we must not forget the eulogy of Dryden, who calls Donne "the greatest wit, though not the best poet of our nation."

In an article on 'Unwritten Literary Laws' 'Ouida' contends for cheap editions of all novels in paper covers. Doubtless the Colonial editions, so well-known here, would please her, but she does not seem to know of them. For she says that there seems to be an unwritten law in English literature that cheapness must of necessity be allied to ugliness. She contrasts a book published in Florence for eighteen pence, with its good paper, printing, and illustrations, with cheap English books. Surely nothing on the Continent can compare with the beauty of type and paper of hundreds of Colonial editions.

Other articles deal with 'The Menacing Comet'; 'The Venezuelan Award'; and 'The Letters of Mary Sibylla Holland'.